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How to Defeat a Treaty's Object and
Purpose Pending Entry into Force:
Toward Manifest Intent
JanKlabbers*
ABSTRACT

Under Article 18 of the 1969 Vlienna Convention on the Law

of Treaties, states that have signed or ratified a treaty are
supposed to refrainfrom acts which might defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty pending its entry into force. After noting
that international lawyers and academics have recognized
various types of treaties, the Article begins by observing that
traditionally the interim obligation operates well in contractual
situations but not in normative situations. Furthermore, the
Author argues that where treaties are normative, the traditional
conception of the interim obligation is insufficient.
While the interim obligation has been recognized in various
internationallegal systems, it remains unclear how to determine
whether the interim obligation is being violated. Several tests
have been proposed, including evaluations of the subjective
intent of the alleged infringing party and the legitimate
expectations of the aggrieved party. The Author contends that
none of the existing tests is adequate. Rather, he proposes the
possibility of a "manifest intent" test. The manifest intent test
has the advantage of being relatively objective, avoiding the
pitfalls associated with more subjective tests. In addition, the
manifest intent test is more appropriate in normative, noncontractualsituations. The Author finds support for this test in
the preparatoryworks for Article 18, as well as in both judicial
practice and scholarly works.

* Professor of International Law, University of Helsinki.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine this: State X is among the first to sign and ratify a
convention against arbitrary detention. In the period of time between
the ratification by State X and the entry into force of the convention,
State X continues to detain a number of individuals arbitrarily. Does
State X, in doing so, violate international law?
Or picture this: State Y signs a disarmament convention and
plans to ratify it at the earliest possible date, but in the meantime
State Y continues to procure the very armaments that the convention
will ban when it enters into force. Is State Y violating international
law?
Or consider this: State Z has ratified an extensive free trade
agreement that, upon entry into force, will prohibit any new tariffs
and similar charges and will be self-executing. A week or so before
the agreement enters into force, State Z increases tariffs on products
coming from one of its prospective partners, to the detriment of a
producer operating from within that trading partner. Is State Z
acting in violation of international law?
The three scenarios sketched above are more or less
hypothetical, but not completely devoid of realism. The third scenario
is, in fact, a simplified and stylized version of the facts that gave rise
to the Opel Austria case, decided by the Court of First Instance of the
European Community in early 1997.1
The other examples also are not too far removed from real life
occurrences. Angola endured a storm of criticism by continuing to use

1.
Case T-115/94, Opel Austria GmbH v. Council, 1997 E.C.R. 11-39, LEXIS,
Legal (excluding U.S.) Library, ECJ File.
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landmines after having signed the anti-landmine convention. 2 India
met with fierce opposition when it announced its intention to block
the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
after lengthy negotiations but before it signed the convention. 3 Some
commentators analyzed the 1994 agreement facilitating the entry
into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in
terms of whether it violated the Convention itself prior to its entry
into force. 4 In addition, the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons
Convention in 1993 spurred the Committee on Arms Control and
Disarmament Law of the International Law Association to
investigate whether or not obligations may exist for signatories to
arms control agreements prior to their entries into force.5
This recent discovery 6 of the interim obligation is not merely
coincidental. Note that all of the above examples-a human rights
convention, an arms control treaty, and a complex free trade
agreement-are not strictly contractual in nature; instead, they

2.
Paul Brown, Landmines Banned but Threats Stay, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 2.
1999, 1999 WL 12073096 (quoting an anti-landmine activist who accused Angola of
continuing to use landmines after it had signed the convention by stating that such
actions constituted "a flagrant violation of [Angola's] international commitments).
3.
Under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996. art. 14,
35 I.L.M. 1439 (1996), India is one of forty-four states whose consent to be bound is
required before the convention can enter into force. India's announcement in 1996 that
it would not even sign the convention has spurred outcries of bad faith during and
immediately after negotiations. This situation is slightly, but significantly, different
from the Angolan situation in that India's refusal to sign and ratify would have also
prevented entry into force for the other negotiating states.
4.
E.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Entr, into Force of the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 381 (1995) (arguing against such a violation); Law of
the Sea: Momentous Change and Its Aftermath, in CONtEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW ISSUES: CONFLICTS AND CONVERGENCE 296. 315 (Wybo P. Heere ed.. 1996)
(providing the somewhat more critical remarks of Tullio Treves and Dolliver Nelson
during a panel discussion).
5.
Thus, an ILA-backed symposium in 1997 gave rise to a paper by Jan
Klabbers, Strange Bedfellows: The "Interim Obligation" and the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention, in ISSUES OF ARmS CONTROL LAW AND THE CHE-MICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION: OBLIGATIONS INTER SE AND SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS (Eric Myjer ed.,
forthcoming 2001). In addition, the Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament
Law of the International Law Association discussed the topic with great passion at the
ILA's 1998 Taipei session. See INT'L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-EIGHTH
CONFERENCE 164 (Alfred Soons & Michael Byers eds., 1998).
6.
The scarce nature of references to the interim obligation in textbooks
written after the conclusion of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
suggests that the present situation marks a discovery, or perhaps a rediscovery. Thus,
there are mere neutral descriptions of the interim obligation, without analysis, in
SUZANNE BASTID, LES TRAITtS DANS LA VIE INTERNATIONALE: CONCLUSION El EFFETS
50-51 (1985); T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 26 (1974); and PAUL REUrER,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 67 (Jos6 Mico & Peter Haggenmacher trans.,
1995). A brief textbook written on the eve of the Vienna Conference remains silent on
the interim obligation. See generally INGRID DETrER, ESSAYS ON THE LAW uF TREATIES
(1967).
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aspire to create institutions and establish norms of general
application. They are, to use the classic term, law-making treaties.
This suggests that there is something about law-making
conventions which makes their effects desirable (if not their formal
entry into force) without any delay. Indeed, it is awkward to argue
that states have a right to lay landmines if they have signed, and
perhaps have ratified, a treaty prohibiting such practices, simply
because the calendar has not yet reached a certain date. Any
suffering in the interim is suffering for formalities.
Surely
international law must have a rule preventing such situations, and
many contend that this rule is the one embodied in Article 18 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, widely known as the
'7
"interim obligation.
According to its very terms the interim obligation provision of
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention cannot be invoked without more.
Its success depends on whether behavior would defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty concerned, and it is here that a paradox sets in.
Instead of defeating the object and purpose of a law-making
convention, any behavior irreconcilable with it, prior to its entry into
force, actually serves to emphasize the desirability of its entry into
force. The behavior, rather, strengthens the very point of the treaty.
The paradox takes on additional importance because many
states allow treaty provisions to be self-executing under certain
conditions.8
Thus, they need not be transformed into domestic
legislation but are capable of having an immediate effect in domestic
legal orders. Where this is the case, the treaty concerned is no longer
merely an undertaking among states. Hence, without the treaty
attracting new formal partners, individuals or companies who stand
to gain from a proposed treaty may require protection by the law
prior to that treaty's entry into force. 9

7.
Useful general studies include Philippe Cahier, L'Obligation de ne pas
Priver un Traitd de son Object et de son But avant son Entrde en Vigueur, in 1
MILANGEs FERNAND DEHOUSSE, LES PROGRIS DU DROIT DES GENS 31 (M. Bos et al.

eds., 1979); Joni S. Charme, The Interim Obligation of Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties: Making Sense of an Enigma, 25 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 71 (1992); Paul V. McDade, The Interim Obligation Between
Signature and Ratification of a Treaty, 32 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 5 (1985); Werner
Morvay, The Obligation of a State Not to Frustratethe Object of a Treaty Prior to Its
Entry into Force: Comments on Art. 15 of the ILC's 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of
Treaties,

27

ZEITSCHRIFT

FOR

AUSLANDISCHES

OFFENTLICHES

RECHT

UND

VOLKERRECHT 451 (1967); and Joseph Nisot, L'Article 18 de la Convention de Vienne
sur le Droit des Traitis, 1970 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 498.
8.
For a general overview, see Carlos Manuel Vizquez, The Four Doctrines of
Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995).
9.
Indeed, according to many, the traditional Vattellian concept of
international law as regulating predominantly relations between sovereign entities is
no longer fully tenable. Instead, the individual acquires an increasingly central place
in international legal thinking. The most comprehensive analysis to date is THOMAS
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The argument explored in this Article is multi-layered, but may
be summarized as follows. In situations involving alleged infractions
of law-making, normative treaties (as opposed to contractual
undertakings) pending their entry into force, the interim obligation as
laid down in Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides little relief, at least not in the way in which it is
normally understood. That is far from surprising as the interim
obligation has always been premised on contractual thinking, and its
specific formulation in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention has been
inspired by purely contractual notions.
Thus, it requires a
reconceptualization of the interim obligation in order to allow the
interim obligation to adapt to situations involving normative
instruments and in order to provide a useful function in international
law and international relations.
Such a reconceptualization is
already present--albeit often somewhat below the surface-in both
recent scholarly writings and recent judicial practice,' 0 although
these are limited in numbers." The reconceptualization concentrates
on the test to determine whether the interim obligation is violated.
For convenience, this specific reconceptualization of the test of the
interim obligation shall be referred to as a "manifest intent test."
The argument for the manifest intent test is multi-layered in
that it rests on several other foundational points that must be
recognized either as preliminary matters or in passing. The multilayered nature of the argument may make the argument somewhat
difficult to follow and at times give the appearance of repetitiveness.
One such foundational point is that the law of treaties in general is
based on thoroughly contractual notions. A second, related point is
that the contractual underpinnings of the law of treaties are no
longer very helpful in an age where a large number of treaties aspire
(or claim to aspire) to protect the interests of the international
community at large (no matter how amorphous this very notion itself
is) or the interests of individual natural or legal persons within
states. Moreover, the manifest intent test is inevitably rather
abstract. There is, after all, not much existing state practice or case
law on the topic to enliven the argument, and this Article aims to
establish a point of general validity; abstraction, therefore, cannot be
avoided. Still, in essence the claim is straightforward enough: the
interim obligation as traditionally conceived is ill-suited to presentday demands, and so it must be reconstructed. Such reconstruction is

M. FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF:. LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM

(1999).

10.

See infra Parts VI-VII.

11.
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 94 (2000) (noting that
there "is virtually no practice in the application of the provision").
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already under way, as the few judicial decisions and scholarly
12
writings on the topic have witnessed.
Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
carries the title "Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty prior to its entry into force" and reads:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting
the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall
have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the
entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is
13
not unduly delayed.

Thus under Article 18, states that have signed or ratified a treaty are
supposed to refrain from acts which might defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty prior to its entry into force. Yet can it really be
said with respect to the examples mentioned above, that States X, Y,
or Z are engaging in behavior that defeats the object and purpose of
the treaty at issue and are acting in violation of international law?
Upon a regular reading of Article 18 the answer must be in the
negative, for reasons to be explained below. Only a different reading
of Article 18's interim obligation may facilitate qualifying the
behavior of States X, Y, and Z as not only morally untoward, but also
in violation of international law.
This Article is structured as follows. Section II contains some
preliminary remarks. Section III briefly sketches the place of the
interim obligation in legal thinking. Section IV discusses why the
traditional tests for determining whether the interim obligation has
been violated are unsatisfactory.
Section V contains a lengthy
overview of the drafting history of Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention, concentrating on the test to be used. 14 Sections VI and
VII
discuss, respectively,
recent-post-Vienna
Conventionscholarship and judicial practice in which the interim obligation plays
a role. Section VIII concludes the Article.

12.
See infra Parts VI-VII.
13.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 336, 8 I.L.M. 679, 686 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
14.
In other words, a few other elements of Article 18 will remain virtually
undiscussed. The present interest is not with finding out whether Article 18
represents customary international law, whether a violation of the interim obligation
could qualify as evidence of an intent not to become bound, or what time period would
constitute undue delay of entry into force.
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II. A FEW PRELIMINARY REMARKS
As the point of departure for this Article consists of an argument
that the interim obligation as traditionally conceived works well in
contractual situations but not in normative situations, a recognition
of some idea of what that distinction represents is imperative. 15
Since at least the 1930s, and probably earlier, 16 international lawyers
have recognized that there are various types of treaties. Lord
McNair, probably the best known example, famously complained that
in international law, treaties were the only and sadly overworked
workhorse of the system, because they are used for contractual
exchanges, law-making efforts, conveyance-like transactions, and
even as charters of incorporation.1"
Although arguably the invention of binding instruments
emanating from international organizations could provide some
relief, 8 McNair's words are still accurate. Treaties are used to
arrange various types of things. This gives rise to the question
whether the fact that treaties perform different functions does not
also mean that different types of treaties are subjected to different
rules. To some extent, this is also explicitly recognized in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides a separate status
for treaties establishing international organizations 9 and which
occasionally makes legally relevant distinctions between bilateral and
20
multilateral treaties.

15.
It is well established that much of the law of treaties rests upon contractual
notions. See generally, e.g., ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LA,?: A
REAPPRAISAL OF THE LIMITs OF LEGAL IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1986);
SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES, 1945-1986 (1989).
16.
In a string of advisory opinions on the powers of international
organizations given in the course of the 1920s, the Permanent Court of International
Justice gradually developed the awareness that treaties establishing international
organizations are qualitatively different from contractual undertakings. This would
culminate in the Court's finding that the powers of an organization are not based on
interpretation alone, but may require special doctrines, such as the doctrine of
speciality, which holds that organizations have such powers as are conferred upon
them. Advisory Opinion No. 14, Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the
Danube Between Galatz and Braila, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 14, at 64 (Dec. 8).
17.
The Functionsand Differing Legal Characterof Treaties, in A.D. MCNAIR,
THE LAW OF TREATIES 739 (1961).
18.
Then again, binding decisions of organizations that do not rest upon the
immediate consent of all addressees are few and far between. See, for example, the
discussion in HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, I.\-rERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY 811-22 (3d rev. ed. 1995).
19.
Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 5.
20.
Id. art. 60 (material breach).
The Vienna Convention also makes
distinctions on points of detail. Thus, with reservations, a special place is reserved for
reservations of constituent instruments of international organizations. Id. art. 20(3).
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A perennial problem is that no matter how valid such
distinctions between differing treaties may be, it always remains to
be seen how such distinctions ought to be made. After all, treaties
may contain various elements. Still, for present purposes, how
exactly to distinguish between contractual and normative agreements
is not all that relevant, as long as one accepts that such a distinction
21
is meaningful.
This Article argues that where treaties are normative, the
traditional conception of the interim obligation is insufficient, as the
interim obligation is structured to suit contractual exchanges but has,
as traditionally conceived, a much harder time dealing with lawmaking instruments. 22 That distinction is no coincidence: a perusal
of the pertinent literature and other materials indicates that
whenever an example is used to illustrate the working of the interim
obligation-be it a real example or, as is more often the case, a
hypothetical one-the example invariably concerns treaties which are
structured as contractual exchanges. 23 Favorite examples include a
cession of territory 24 and the sale of installations of State A within B's
territory to B. 25 Tariff reduction2 6 and arms reduction agreements or
demilitarization agreements 27 are also often used as examples, and
28
always in forms that suggest an underlying contractual structure.
Thus, the interim obligation has always been conceived as contractual
in nature and has been drafted in its present form exclusively with
contractual exchanges in mind. If there is a valid distinction between
contractual and normative instruments, as many would accept
without more and without precisely demarcating the line between

21.
For an extensive argument to this effect, as well as an impressive catalogue
of distinctions made in the law of treaties, see Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to
Community Interest in InternationalLaw, 250 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADi9MIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 221, 335-52 (1994).
22.
A related, yet different, distinction is that between bipolar and multipolar
treaties. For a brief exploration, see Albert Bleckmann, Zur Wandlung der Strukturen
der Vlkerrechtsvertrage,34 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 218 (1996).

23.
See infra Part VI.
24.
This was mentioned as an example in the Harvard Draft Convention on the
Law of Treaties, prepared under the auspices of Harvard Law School and published as
a supplement to 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 657, 781 (1935) [hereinafter Harvard Draft].
25.
This was mentioned by the International Law Commission at its 788th
meeting. Summary Records of the 788th Meeting, [1965] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 87,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1965.
26.
Harvard Draft, supra note 24, at 781.
27.
Id.
28.
The Harvard Draft adds other contractual examples: navigation rights,
sale of goods, and restitution of property wrongfully taken. Id. at 781-82. The latter
also arose within the ILC, at its 788th meeting. See supra note 25. It should be noted,
perhaps, that an arms reduction agreement may be structured not only contractually,
with each party undertaking to reduce a certain number or percentage of existing
capacity, but also normatively, with all parties undertaking to eradicate their
capacities completely.
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them, then it should come as no surprise that a contract-inspired
notion such as the interim obligation has trouble addressing noncontractual situations.
Those difficulties become acutely visible when the interim
obligation is applied to a concrete set of facts. Here it becomes
important to know what test to use when trying to determine
whether behavior defeats the object and purpose of treaty. This
Article contends that the best possible test is a manifest intent-or,
in more pejorative terms, a manifest bad faith-test, and that such a
test meets with some-albeit not unqualified-support in the
preparatory works of the interim obligation's codification as Article
18 of the Vienna Convention, 29 and also finds support (although often
unwittingly so) in the literature and in a few recent judicial
30
decisions.
One preliminary point must be established. With contractual
exchanges, the precise test employed to determine whether a treaty's
object and purpose has been defeated is not all that relevant in
making that determination, although it may assume relevance later
on, such as when deciding compensation. Because the precise test
used in contractual situations is largely irrelevant, one may presume
that the drafters of the Vienna Convention intuitively realized that
the precise modalities of the interim obligation were of less
importance than the interim obligation itself, precisely because
31
contractual notions were foremost in their minds.
Perhaps an example will clarify things. Consider one of the most
perplexing examples of this tension, the prototype of an interim
obligation situation: a treaty for the cession of a piece of territory
32
from State A to State B, to take effect some time after ratification.
In principle, one can think of three types of tests to determine
whether such a treaty's object and purpose are defeated as the result
of behavior. One can employ an objective test-is the exchange still
executable or has the treaty's object and purpose been defeated, 33 or
two different sorts of subjective tests: one focusing on the subjective

29.
30.

See infra Part V.
See infra Parts VI and VII respectively.

31.
As will be illustrated infra in Part V. relatively little of the preparatory
focused on the test to be employed. Much of the discussion was aimed at
establishing the interim obligation as a legal rule, rather than as an emanation of
morality, and at debating at which moment it starts to apply-only after signature or
ratification, or already during negotiations?
32.
It is this example that recurs not merely in the drafting of Article 18 but
also in scholarly writings. E.g., Morvay, supranote 7, at 453.
33.
I will outline later why the objective test envisaged in Artcle 18 is

work

impossible to execute standing on its own; it will always lapse into a test either of
subjective intent or of legitimate expectations. See infra Part IV.
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intent 34 of the offending party (be it akin to negligence or to mens
rea),35 the other focusing on the legitimate expectations of the
36
aggrieved party.
Suppose that prior to handing over the territory to B, State A
conducts a few nuclear experiments. Whatever test is employed to
determine whether the treaty may survive, the result will be the
same. State A acts with subjective intent; not only are its tests
themselves not accidental, but A also can be accused of attempting to
defeat the treaty's object and purpose. B's legitimate expectations
also are frustrated, in that the value of the undertaking is
diminished. Furthermore, the treaty clearly cannot be executed in
the same manner as before, precisely because it is objectively evident
that its object has somehow undergone a detrimental change.
Now consider that A does not engage in any untoward behavior,
but that the territory in question falls victim to a natural disaster.
As a result, the treaty is no longer executable as before, but this
occurs without any subjective intent on the part of State A. 37 The
natural disaster frustrates B's legitimate expectations, but it would
be unfair to ask A to compensate B, or even to expect A to cover all
losses that B incurs. After all, A's legitimate expectations are equally
frustrated. Again, the test employed is irrelevant, for the result is
the same whether one thinks in term of subjective intent (absent
here, so no one is liable) or legitimate expectations (present here with
both parties, so again no one can be held liable). 38 The objective test
is not helpful either, as no behavior of either of the parties was
involved.
The notion underlying this Article is that the relative3 9
irrelevance of the test applies to all contractual situations: whether

34.
Intention is perhaps best defined as "the linking of means and ends in a
plan or proposal-for-action adopted by choice in preference to alternative proposals
(including to do nothing)." John Finnis, Intention in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OFTORT LAW 229 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
35.
For an argument that negligence is an emanation of subjective intent
rather than of inadvertence, see H.L.A. Hart, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal
Responsibility, in H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 136 (1968).

ESSAYS IN THE

36.
For a brief but very useful conceptualization, see P.P. Craig, Legitimate
Expectations: A ConceptualAnalysis, 108 L. Q. REV. 79 (1992).
37.
Perhaps it is useful to note here that in most cases-those where an act
actually occurs, as opposed to it being merely planned-intent includes an element of
foresight. On this point in particular, see ALAN R. WHITE, GROUNDS OF LIABILITY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 82-90 (1985).

38.
To be sure, the objective test also provides this result; there will no longer
be something to execute.
39.
"Relative," of course, because it may matter when it comes to compensation.
Those who focus on legitimate expectations may be more inclined to compensate than
those for whom subjective intent is a strict requirement.
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one looks at the subjective intent of A or the legitimate expectations
40
of B, or even applies an objective test, the result will be the same.
Normative situations are strikingly different particularly when
the actors involved are not only states, but also individuals relying on
the potential self-executing provisions of treaties about to enter into
force. In such circumstances, a test of legitimate expectations
(broadly conceived) will occasionally show the same result as a test of
bad faith, but without the intervening (and, in theory at least,
controlling) variable of the defeat of the treaty's object and purpose.
Put differently, one can plausibly argue that an act of torture prior to
the entry into force of a convention prohibiting torture is an act of
subjective intent, perhaps even to the point-however perverse-of
being intended to nullify the future regime. If one accepts that the
expectations of private citizens are among those protected under the
interim obligation (which is far from self-evident, as will be discussed
below), 4 ' then one also can argue that the citizens of a state that has
signed or ratified the anti-torture convention may legitimately expect
to remain free from torture pending the convention's entry into force.
One cannot seriously maintain, however, that a single act of torture
defeats the object and purpose of the treaty concerned. In fact, if
anything, such an act (or even a multitude thereof) serves only to
underline the importance of the convention.
The most practical way around this particular problem-the
circumstance that however horrendous behavior may be, it cannot
seriously be maintained that a treaty's object and purpose are
defeated-seemingly would be to argue that behavior need not so
much defeat a treaty's object and purpose, but simply violate the
prospective treaty's provisions. Indeed various writers have made
such an argument, analyzing in particular the attempts to establish
unilateral sea-bed mining regimes by signatories of the 1982 UN
42
Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Still, such an approach is flawed, for at least two reasons. First,
the text of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention clearly resists any
attempt to break up the object and purpose of a treaty into the objects
and purposes of smaller parts of the treaty. 43 Second, to hold that a

40.

This finds some support by partial analogy in the neutral language of

Article 61 of the Vienna Convention, which deals with supervening impossibility of
performance after a treaty has entered into force. Vienna Convention, supra note 13,
art. 61. A natural disaster may qualify as a ground for suspension or termination of a
treaty, regardless of intent (naturally) or expectations.
41.
See infra text accompanying note 177.
42.

E.g., SAID MAHMOUDI, THE LAW OF DEEP SEA-BED MINING 251 (1987);

McDade, supra note 7, at 31-40 (similarly analyzing behavior in terms of its
compatibility with individual treaty provisions).
43.
Recent methodologies of the notion of object and purpose in the law of
treaties include Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek, The 'Object and Purpose' of a
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violation of a provision of a treaty prior to its entry into force would
defeat the treaty's object and purpose is tantamount to saying that
the treaty actually assumes legal force upon signature rather than
44
upon ratification.

III. A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE INTERIM OBLIGATION
The idea underlying Article 18 makes eminent sensespecifically, the value of an undertaking ought not to be diminished
prior to the transaction being completed. If State A cedes a piece of
territory to B, then obviously B is entitled to expect A to refrain from
any activities which might lessen the value of the piece of territory
before it is actually transferred. Thus, State A should refrain from
such activities as nuclear testing, dumping toxic waste, destroying
infrastructure, or arguably even exploiting the territory's natural
resources. At the very least, A should not intensify its exploitative
activities.
In this fashion, the idea of an interim obligation has been part
and parcel of classical international legal thought in one form or
another. Hugo Grotius, approaching the topic by approximation and
under the general heading "On contracts," noted that "if ownership
shall not pass immediately the seller will be under obligation to give
possession according to contract. '45
Em6ric de Vattel, when
discussing agreements
concluded
between
persons holding
insufficient powers-so-called sponsios, opined with characteristic
aplomb that although those implementing the agreement without
waiting for ratification would be "guilty of imprudence" and
committing "an egregious error," nonetheless "the other party is not
justifiable in taking advantage of his folly and retaining possession of
'46
what he has so given.
Similarly, throughout the twentieth century until the conclusion
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1969, 4 7 the notion

Treaty: An Enigma?, 3 AUSTRIAN REV. INT'L & EUR. L. 311 (1998); Jan Klabbers, Some
Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties, 8 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 138
(1997).
44.
See also AUST, supra note 11, at 94. Of course, there are treaties, usually
those of minor political import, that may enter into force upon signature. In such a
case, there is no interim period between signature and entry into force, and
accordingly, the problem of the interim obligation cannot logically arise.
45.

HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 352 (1925) (discussing

transfer of ownership).
46.
EMERIC DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 223 (Joseph Chitty trans., 1852)
(discussing obligations arising from sponsios).
47.
On the general subject of the moment of conclusion of a treaty, see E.W.
Vierdag, The Time of the "Conclusion"of a Multilateral Treaty: Article 30 of the Vienna
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of the interim obligation has met with general support in the
pertinent literature. Samuel B. Crandall wrote in 1916 that pending
entry into force, "neither party may, without repudiating the
proposed treaty, voluntarily place itself in a position where it cannot
comply with the conditions as they existed at the time the treaty was
signed." 48 The Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, prepared in
1935 under the auspices of Harvard Law School, contained a draft
Article on the interim obligation, although it noted that it concerned a
duty of good faith rather than of international law. Draft Article 9
reads:
Unless otherwise provided in the treaty itself, a State on behalf of
which a treaty has been signed is under no duty to perform the
obligations stipulated, prior to the coming into force of the treaty with
respect to that State; under some circumstances, however, good faith
may require that pending the coming into force of the treaty the State
shall, for a reasonable time after signature, refrain from taking action
which would render performance by any party of the obligations
49
stipulated impossible or more difficult.

In his brief but monumental study of full powers and ratification, J.
Mervyn Jones, writing in 1949, formulated the interim obligation as

follows:
Signature may, in conditions not yet defined by positive law, commit a
State to the obligation not to exploit the signed text for its own
purposes by abusing its discretion to ratify. Where a State has led
other States to believe that its ratification will follow as a matter of
course it ought not to do anything between signature and ratification
50
which would frustrate the purpose of the treaty.

Finally, Lord McNair, possibly the greatest authority on the law of
treaties of his time, stated with due caution that the version which he
"believed to be correct" held that "one party to a treaty must not,
pending ratification, do anything which will hamper any action that
may be taken by the other party if and when the treaty enters into
force ....

51

Hence, there seems to have been general agreement among
writers that, in one form or another, an obligation exists not to impair

Convention on the Law of Treaties and Related Provisions.59 BRIT. Y.B. IN'L L 75, 92
(1988).
48.
SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCF2,IENr 34344 (2d ed. 1916) (discussing what he somewhat inaccurately termed the "provisionally
binding" force of treaties).
49.
Harvard Draft, supra note 24, art. 9, at 658 (containing the interim
obligation).
50.
J. MERVYN JONES, FULL POWERS AND RATIFICATION: A STUDY IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF TREATY-MAKING PROCEDURE 89 (1949) (positing the interim
obligation).
51.
MCNAIR, supra note 17, at 200 (formulating the interim obligation).
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52
the value of an undertaking pending ratification or entry into force.
53
The precise content and nature of the rule, however, are less clear.
As to the rule's nature, the Harvard Research team considered it a
duty of good faith-morality, we may presume-rather than law.
Lord McNair did not express himself one way or the other, 54 whereas
the absence of anything on the topic with Crandall and Mervyn Jones
may be read as suggesting that to their minds, the interim obligation
55
was of a legal nature.
The views on the contents of the rule were even more divergent.
For the Harvard Research scholars, the interim obligation was to be
narrowly construed, as an exception to the sound proposition that the
legal effect of treaties normally only commences upon entry into
force. 56 For Crandall, what mattered was that states should not
make their own positions untenable. 57 Mervyn Jones warned against
defeating the treaty's purpose. 58 McNair's views were inspired not so
much by concern for the treaty or the defaulting party but mainly by
59
concern for the position of the aggrieved party.
Caselaw on the interim obligation has been relatively scarce, but
the few classic cases that exist nonetheless illustrate the problems
surrounding the interim obligation. The British-American tribunal
deciding the Iloilo Claims, arising out of the Spanish-American war
and addressing issues of liability caused by alleged delays on the part
of the United States in taking control of the Philippine town of Iloilo
after the signing of the peace agreement in 1898, held that no duty
arose for the United States under the terms of the then stillunratified treaty: "De Jure there was no sovereignty over the islands

52.
Some have argued that the obligation applies pending entry into force. as
ratification expresses consent to be bound, but cannot apply after mere signature
where signature does not express consent. After all, states are free to decide whether
or not to ratify. With this in mind, it has been suggested that it is hardly a coincidence
that the only case law available relating to an interim obligation after signature
pertains to peace treaties, where obviously the defeated party is not free to decide
whether or not to ratify. Cahier, supra note 7, at 34.
53.
See Morvay, supra note 7, at 456 (writing in 1967 and noting that there is
much disagreement on the exact conditions under which the obligation exists and on
the exact extent of it).
54.
While Lord McNair did note that there was some debate on whether the
interim obligation was an obligation of good faith or strict law, he did not take sides.
MCNAIR, supranote 17, at 200.
55.
After all, these authors wrote legal treatises. It goes without saying that
authors of such treatises will not remind the reader on every page that they are
discussing a legal norm rather than any other type of norm.
56.
See generally Harvard Draft, supra note 24.
57.
See generally CRANDALL, supra note 48.
58.
See generally JONES, supra note 50.
59.
See generally MCNAIR, supra note 17.
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until the treaty was ratified."60 It held that whether the United
States should have entered the town of Iloilo earlier so as to quell a
Philippine uprising was a matter of discretion. 61
The Turkish-Greek Mixed Arbitral Tribunal deciding A.
Megalidis v.Turkey, however, took a slightly different tack and held
that "from the time of the signature of the Treaty and before its entry
into force the contracting parties were under the duty to do nothing
which might impair the operation of its clauses." 62 The differences
between these two holdings may largely be explained by recognizing
the type of behavior that was involved; in Iloilo, the British wished
that the United States act positively prior to ratification, whereas in
Megalidis the idea was rather that Turkey should have refrained
from acting. 63 Both cases nevertheless illustrate the uncertainty with
respect to the precise scope of the interim obligation and how to test
whether the interim obligation is met.
Neither the Permanent Court of International Justice nor the
International Court of Justice has ever had to pronounce itself on the
interim obligation. In the German Settlers case, however, the interim
obligation was invoked before the Permanent Court of International
Justice." Domestic courts have, however, occasionally addressed the
issue. McNair refers, without providing many details, to United
States v. D'Auterive, where a local U.S. court held that, in McNair's

60.
Iloilo Claims, 3 Ann. Dig. 336 (British-American Trib. 1925). The words
quoted are cited in McNAIR, supra note 17, at 202.
61.
Iloilo Claims, 3 Ann. Dig. at 336.
62.
A.A. Megalidis v. Turkey, 4 Ann. Dig. 395 (Turkish-Greek MLxed Arb. Trib.
1928). The words quoted are those of the summary from the Annual Digest of Public
International Law Cases. These words coincide with the French original which is
reproduced in part in MCNAIR, supranote 17, at 202 C[I]I
est de prmncipe que dcja avec
la signature d'un Trait6 et avant sa mise en vigueur, il existe pour les parties
contractantes une obligation de ne rien faire qui puisse nuire au Trait en diminuant la
portde de ses clauses ... . ). A later case held that a directive issued shortly before the
entry into force of a treaty, which would render such a directive illegal, amounted to an
abuse of power and invalidated the directive. Termination of Employment (Austria),
23 I.L.R. 470, 471 (Austrian Supreme Court 1956).
63.
Jean-Pierre Cot has observed that the ILC's draft, and by extension Article
18 as adopted, confirms that no positive action is demanded from governments. It
concerns instead a duty of abstention. Jean-Pierre Cot. La Bonne Foi el la Conclusion
des Traitis,REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 140, 155 (1968. II).
64.
Certain Questions Relating to Settlers of German Origin in the Territory
Ceded by Germany to Poland, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6, at 6 (Sept. 10). In The
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, the PCIJ also saw no need to "consider what the
legal position would have been if the Treaty had not been ratified at the time of the
Court's judgment." The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
2, at 33 (Aug. 30). As the treaty upon which Greece built its jurisdictional claim had
not yet been ratified when Greece filed its claim, Judge Moore, dissenting, disagreed:
"The doctrine that governments are bound to ratiy whatever their plenipotentiaries.
acting within the limits of their instructions, may sign, and that treaties may therefore
be regarded as legally operative and enforceable before they have been ratified, is
obsolete, and lingers only as an echo from the past." Id. at 57.
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words, "a State which had signed a treaty undertaking to cede
territory to the other party would at least commit a breach of faith if,
while the treaty was still awaiting ratification, it alienated a part of
'65
the territory in question to another State.
The idea of the value of an undertaking prior to performance or
execution also appears, not surprisingly, to be generally recognized as
a basic notion in the law of contract. P.S. Atiyah, for one, has no
problem whatsoever in elucidating the binding nature of promises
and contracts relating to future behavior. 66 In addition, treatises on
contract law usually pay some attention to the idea of anticipatory
breach, 67 defined by one authority as the situation that arises "when,
before performance is due, a party either renounces the contract or
disables himself from performing it."68

In short, the idea that the

seller may not impair the value of a transaction to the detriment of
the buyer is well settled.
The notion has even entered European Community (EC) law in
its own right. With respect to EC directives-which, by their very
nature, grant the governments of the EC's Member States a certain
period of time in order to arrange their implementation, the EC Court
has held that Member States "must refrain from taking any measures
liable seriously to compromise the result prescribed" during the
69
period for transformation.
International law, then, is clearly not the only legal system
recognizing an interim obligation. It remains unclear how to
determine whether the interim obligation is being violated. What
remains unclear is which test to employ, for as the opinions of

MCNAIR, supra note 17, at 203 (describing the court's decision). Also often
65.
mentioned is an obiter dictum of umpire Francis Lieber in the 1868 case Ignacio Torres
v. United States who argued that if U.S. ratification of the peace treaty with Mexico
had been certain, the U.S. attack on a Mexican town in the interim period "would
certainly be considered . . . a fraudulent and invalid transaction." Ignacio Torres v.
U.S., No. 565 (Zacualtipan Claims, American-Mexican Joint Comm'n 1868), reprinted
in 4 JOHN B. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO
WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 3798, 3801 (1898).

66.

Atiyah acknowledges that it is difficult to ground this in a single reason.

P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 209-11 (1981) (discussing the basis of future

obligation).
67.
E.g., 4 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 984 (1951) ("Ifa
promisor so conducts himself as to make the substantial performance of his promise
impossible, this is a repudiation of his promise and has the same legal effect as would a
repudiation in words."). See also J. BEATSON, ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 544 (27th ed.

1998) (referring to anticipatory breach).
68.

G.H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 769 (9th ed. 1995) (emphasis

deleted).
69.
Case C-129/96, Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v. R6gion Wallonne,
1997 E.C.R. 1-7411, 1-7435, para. 45. The Court also pointed out, however, that
Member States cannot be faulted for not having transposed directives before the
transposition period has expired. Id. para. 43.
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twentieth century pre-Vienna Convention scholars indicate, at least
three tests are possible: (1) an objective test focusing upon the
purpose of the treaty (the position maintained by Mervyn Jones);70 (2)
a test focusing on subjective intent (the position of Crandall);7 1 and
(3) a test (advocated by McNair) concentrating on 72
reliance or
legitimate expectations on the part of the aggrieved party.
IV. BETWEEN INTENT AND EXPECTATIONS

At first, it might seem ideal to focus on legitimate expectations;
indeed this is what a majority of authors, in particular those writing
after the conclusion of the Vienna Convention, have proposed. 73 The
benefits of a legitimate expectations test are rarely spelled out, but
presumably amount to the following. The first benefit is that since it
may be next to impossible to actually prove subjective bad faith, a
legitimate expectations test would prove more workable.7 4 Second, at
least when focusing on the legitimate expectations of the aggrieved
party, there is some concrete (or at least perceived) damage to be
corrected. The interim obligation, in other words, has an object in
reality, rather than in abstraction, which renders it measurable and
workable.
Particularly with normative treaties, however, State A may
engage in uncommendable behavior but without necessarily causing
damage or frustrating anyone's expectations. 75 Thus, to accelerate
the production of soon-to-be-prohibited weaponry is not, necessarily,
commendable behavior, but unless the weapons are actually used it
cannot be said to cause any damage. Similarly, to enact a law that
would, upon application, violate a prospective human rights
convention is not commendable, but unless and until the law is
76
actually applied, no actual damage will result.

70.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
71.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
72.
See supranote 17 and text accompanying note 51.
73.
See infra Part VI.
74.
E.g., McDade, supranote 7, at 21.
75.
Except perhaps in the abstract manner in which we can say that policies
are disappointing because we had hoped our governments to be more humane, or less
calculating. Surely, though, this type of disappointment is not captured by any notion
of legitimate expectations.
76.
Indeed, there is a general consensus among international lawyers that to
have a wrongful law on the books does not usually, as such, constitute an
internationally wrongful act. Wrongfulness is incurred as soon as the law is actually
applied. See generally, e.g., Wolfram Karl, The Time Factor in the Low of State
Responsibility, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE REspONsIBILITY 95 (Marina
Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds., 1987).
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Thus, while a legitimate expectations test may serve to focus on
concrete damage once it occurs, it nonetheless has drawbacks,
particularly in situations that are not contractually structured. The
first drawback is somewhat jurisprudential in nature: expectations,
however legitimate, are not (not yet, perhaps) rights, and as Atiyah
dryly observed, life is full of disappointed expectations. 77 Whereas
full-fledged rights clearly deserve protection, it is less obvious why
expectations deserve protection,7 8 especially where expectations
might be largely in the eye of the beholder. Hence, legitimate
expectations have a hard time standing on their own.
To overcome this problem with legitimate expectations, one is
forced to resort to the subjective intent of the offending party in
arguing that the interim obligation has been violated. It is after all,
wrong to frustrate someone else's expectations if it can be avoided, in
particular if the offending state has created those expectations to
begin with. Yet, resort to subjective intent is precisely the one thing
that a focus on legitimate expectations was to remedy.
Another problem with a legitimate expectations test is that
legitimate expectations, at least in some formulations, seem to
presuppose a contractual bargain of sorts. Lauterpacht, who played
an influential role in drafting the Vienna Convention as one of the
ILC's special "Rapporteurs" on the topic, spoke in telling fashion of
consideration, deploring the possibility that expectations for which
consideration was given could be frustrated. 79 Yet, consideration, in
the quid pro quo sense usually ascribed to it, while of obvious
importance in contractual contexts, hardly has a place in normative
discourse. With law-making or normative treaties, it is awkward to
point to clearcut tangible consideration, for that suggests that states
have something material to gain from, for instance, outlawing
genocide or torture.8 0 The connection between expectations and
something else-here, consideration-suggests that expectations
cannot stand on their own and has the additional drawback of
suggesting that the expectations test is limited in applicability to
contractual undertakings. In other words, where agreements are not

77.
78.

ATIYAH, supra note 66, at 210.
Perhaps for this reason, Bin Cheng speaks of imperfect rights rather than

expectations. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 111 (1953).

79.
See infra text accompanying note 112. Rather amazingly, the same passage
is downplayed, and misleadingly so, by Charme as merely the opinion of a "delegate"
and as "not especially authoritative." Charme, supra note 7, at 102 n. 143.
80.
If such concepts as gain and reciprocity play a role in such settings at all, it
is in the diffuse version of reciprocity rather than the specific quid pro quo version. For
a brief, and relatively rare, conceptual investigation of reciprocity along these lines, see
Robert 0. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, in ROBERT 0. KEOHANE,
INTERNATIONAL

INSTITUTIONS

RELATIONS THEORY 132 (1989).
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based on consideration, there is little to gain in combining legitimate
expectations with consideration.
There are other, more practical, drawbacks to the legitimate
expectations test, particularly in normative situations. For instance,
whose legitimate expectations deserve protection? Surely those of the
treaty partner or treaty partners, but with normative instruments
that can hardly be the whole answer. Rather the opposite is true: if
anyone may legitimately expect State X not to defeat a human rights
convention pending entry into force, it is the inhabitants of State X,
perhaps even more so than the treaty partners. 8 ' If the expectations
of all inhabitants qualify then there is hardly any behavior left which
is still excusable pending entry into force. Any form of behavior in
violation of a prospective provision will inevitably frustrate someone's
expectations. Accordingly, the treaty will, in effect, assume force
upon signature, thus rendering the institution of ratification obsolete.
That, in turn, is difficult to reconcile with the intentions of the
drafters8 2 as well as with present-day ideas about democracy and
foreign affairs, which hold that foreign affairs may be subjected to
democratic control.8 3 Additionally, if the expectations of entities
within the aggrieved party are protected, should not those of entities
within the offending party also find protection? After all, their
expectations may be just as legitimate.I Once again, the end result
is that nearly everything will be prohibited before the prohibition
formally enters into force.
Yet another problematic aspect of a legitimate expectations test
is that it may not be altogether clear at what point in time legitimate
expectations may arise. Private persons are usually oblivious to the
niceties of ratification, as ratification usually happens quietly
through the appropriate diplomatic channels.
If anything, the

81.
Indeed, some go so far as to claim that the consent of right holders under
human rights treaties is required in order to create exceptions, or by extension, amend
or even terminate the treaties concerned. E.g., MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM1, POWER AND
THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INrERNATIONAL

LAW 200 (1999).
82.
The drafters may, after all, decide to have their agreement enter into force
upon signature or to have it applied provisionally pending entry into force. Where they
nonetheless insist on ratification, ratification must be taken seriously. See Ambatielos
(Greece v. U.K.), 1952 I.C.J. 28, 43 (July 1) (noting that ratification is "an
indispensable condition for bringing [a treaty] into operation" when it is provided for
and stating that ratification "is not, therefore, a mere formal act, but an act of vital
importance.").
83.
Compare, e.g., MIROSLAV NINCIC. DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE
FALLACY OF POLITICAL REALISM (1992) (vigorously arguing in favor of democratic
control over foreign policy and, therewith, in favor of ratification), with LOUIS HENKIN,
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990) (making a similar

argument in more moderate terms).
84.
See infra Part VII for the circumstances surrounding the Danisco Sugar
case before the EC Court.
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moment of signing a treaty captivates a nation, 85 but surely to insist
on the moment of signature as the decisive moment for the creation of
legitimate expectations is once more to risk seeing the institution of
ratification be reduced to naught. After all, having signed, states
remain at liberty not to ratify.
In addition, a problem exists because in some circumstances
legitimate expectations may not be legitimate at all. It is no
coincidence that in disarmament circles the maxim of "trust but
verify" recurs time and again; 86 simply to trust a potentially deadly
foe on his word (or signature) is unforgivably naive. The very concept
of verification almost by definition undermines any possibility that
legitimate expectations arise at all in the context of arms control and
disarmament. Ironically, the relatively recent invention of human
rights monitoring may end up doing much the same for human rights.
In other settings, potentially aggrieved actors may simply be
unaware of the process-not all small enterprises, for instance, will
be immediately aware of what goes on in the field of treaty-making,
not even when it may affect their businesses, resulting in the literal
absence of legitimate expectations. 87 If there are no legitimate
expectations, then there is nothing to protect. 8 8 In such situations no
legitimate expectations even arise, yet to conclude therefore that the
interim obligation does not and can not apply to disarmament
conventions or to possibly self-executing free trade arrangements is
not persuasive. A legitimate expectations test raises quite a few
conceptual questions and, more fundamentally still, inevitably must
refer back to subjective intent.
To focus on subjective intent, however, is hardly a feasible
alternative.
The subjective intent test's greatest advantage is

85.
Alternatively or additionally, the moment or moments when a proposed
treaty is discussed in parliament may also do so. Yet where, as in the Netherlands,
some seventy-five per cent of treaties are tacitly approved, this offers little help. Jan
Klabbers, The New Dutch Law on the Approval of Treaties, 44 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 629,
634 (1995).
86.
See generally Kenneth W. Abbott, 'Trust but Verify'" The Production of
Information in Arms Control Treatiesand Other InternationalAgreements, 26 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1 (1993).
87.
The 1974 Nuclear Tests cases are instructive by analogy, given the absence
of reliance on the part of Australia and New Zealand that France would, as indicated in
a handful of official statements, refrain from further nuclear tests. Where concrete
reliance was absent, the Court wavered between intent and a kind of abstract reliance.
Nuclear Tests (Austr. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 269, paras. 43-46 (Dec. 20). In a later
case, it clarified that France in Nuclear Tests had had no other option but to commit
itself unilaterally, and, therefore, may be deemed to have had an intent to do so.
Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 574, para. 40
(Dec. 22).
88.
Unless one wishes to resort to an objectified form of legitimate
expectations, which is essentially what this paper advocates under the banner of
manifest intent.
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probably that it is in line with prevailing positivist thinking in
international law, according to which the intentions of sovereign
states play a pivotal role in all walks of life, from law-making to
incurring responsibility. 89 Yet, the subjective intent test comes vith
drawbacks of its own. First, as a philosophical truism, it may be wellnigh impossible to identify someone else's subjective intent; to
paraphrase an ancient maxim, not even the devil knows what is
inside a man's head. 90
More importantly, a subjective intent test fails to do justice in
cases where the offensive behavior is accidental rather than
intentional but still results in some sort of damage. 9 1 In such cases,
one must resort to a legitimate expectations test in order to achieve
some measure of justice, yet the main reason to focus on subjective
intent is precisely as an alternative to a legitimate expectations test.
Similar reasoning applies where a treaty regime appears not to be
respected pending entry into force due to honest differences of
92
interpretation.
Thus, the legitimate expectations test is ultimately bound to
resort to subjective intent; the subjective intent test, on the other
hand, ends up referring to legitimate expectations. 93 A structural
tension between the two main tests developed in doctrine, and in
light of the inevitable symbiosis of the tests (others would rather
speak of oscillation), an objective test appears to be the ideal onethat is, where behavior objectively defeats a treaty's object and
purpose, such behavior is to be viewed as an internationally wrongful
act giving rise to responsibility.
Yet, the objective test prescribed by Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention displays a tension between doctrine and empirical reality
for the "defeat of object and purpose" test is far from objective and

89.
The leading illustration of this conception is still the case of the S.S. Lotus.
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7) (holding that
international legal rules emanate from the free will of states).
90.
Anne de Moor, Intention in the Law of Contract: Elusive or Illusory?, 106 L
Q. REV. 632, 648 (1990) C([The intent of man cannot be tried, for the devil himself
knows not the intent of man.").
91.
Which is precisely why in international space law and international
environmental law, issue areas where damage typically results from accidents rather
than intent, regimes of strict liability have proved popular and useful. For an intricate
analysis concerning international environmental law, see REN9 LEFEBER,
TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL INTERFERENCE AND THE ORIGIN OF STATE LIABILITY

(1996).

92.
As Rosenne notes, it may not always be easy to distinguish a breach of
treaty from a difference of interpretation. SHABTAI ROSENNE, BREACH OF TREATY 120
(1985).
93.

For powerful arguments that international law in general oscillates

between seeming opposites, see DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES

(1987) and especially MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI,

FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA:

STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENr (1989).

THE
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proves unworkable in practice. The unworkability results because
the very notion of what constitutes a treaty's object and purpose is, to
a large extent, in the eye of the beholder. People may reasonably
differ on what constitutes the object and purpose of such landmark
conventions as the United Nations Charter or the Treaty
Establishing the European Union, 94 and where multilateral
conventions can be reduced to sets of bilateral rights and obligations,
the multilateral convention may lack a unifying object and purpose. 95
Even where a consensus exists on a given treaty's object and purpose,
disagreement on the type of behavior which would defeat this object
and purpose may remain.
Thus, even if objectivity were attainable, and even if third party
settlement were institutionalized to a high degree so as to present
authoritative interpretations of what constitutes a given treaty's
object and purpose, one cannot tell whether on its own the seemingly
objective test of Article 18 lends itself for application without more.
In other words, it is questionable whether one can look at behavior
involving the "violation" of a prospective treaty at all without looking
either at the offending party's intent or the aggrieved party's
expectations. If that is true, any objective test is bound to lapse into
the same deadlock already represented by the two subjective tests;
that of endless oscillation between subjective intent and legitimate
expectations. To think of defeat of object and purpose in terms other
than those of intent or expectations is an impossibility. If no bad
faith was present, and no expectations were frustrated, then it is
impossible to hold that the treaty's object and purpose were
nevertheless defeated, unless as the result of some sort of force
majeure. 96 The interim obligation, however, does not cover situations
such as force majeure.
Thus, a double bind results. The only way to overcome the
tension between the two main doctrinal-subjective-tests is to leave
those behind, and replace it by another tension-that between the
objective test and the reality of its impossibility. To overcome the
latter problem, one can only replace it by the former. Where strict
objectivism is impossible, and where the two major tests to find out
whether a treaty's object and purpose have been defeated pending

94.
For the context of material breach of treaty, which is defined as breach of a
provision essential to the accomplishment of the treaty's object and purpose, see D. W.
Greig, Reciprocity, Proportionality,and the Law of Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 295, 345
(1994). See Buffard & Zemanek, supra note 43; Klabbers, supra note 43.
95.
ROSENNE, supra note 15, at 80-84.
96.
In terms borrowed from criminal law, the actus reus cannot be seen in
isolation from either mens rea or some sense of injury or damage. For a general
discussion, see R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1990).
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entry into force are of limited use, one may wonder whether no way is
left to apply the interim obligation.
The remainder of this Article is devoted to an exploration of the
possibility of substituting a "manifest intent" test for the unworkable
tests described earlier.
A manifest intent test has two clear
advantages. First, it has the distinct advantage of being relatively
objective-what matters is the intent of an act's author as it
manifests itself to the outside world-thus avoiding many of the
pitfalls associated with relying on either form of subjective test.
Second, it can do justice to reality far better than the objective test of
Article 18 in non-contractual situations. While to think in terms of a
defeat of a treaty's object and purpose makes no sense whatsoever
with non-contractual treaties, to think of behavior in terms of right
and wrong makes eminent sense, particularly in the context of
normative instruments.
Nothing is particularly novel about a manifest intent test. One
could argue that in many cases when trying to determine whether a
violation of international law has taken place, "intent is 'constructed'
or implied from the nature of the acts themselves." 97 Much the same
applies to reconstructing the terms of an agreement. 98 In the context
of determining whether there is an intent to be bound by a treaty, a
manifest intent test also is involved. 99 The novelty of this Article is
in proposing such a way of thinking in connection with the interim
obligation. While the manifest intent test may not establish the
absolute truth, the preparatory works of Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention offer some support for its use, and as a manifest intent
test is being used in both judicial practice and recent scholarly
contributions, at least it may result in what Neil MacCormick has
once so felicitously described as the "relative truth."10 0

V. DRAFTING ARTICLE 18 AND IS TEST
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was drafted over
a period of two decades by the International Law Commission (ILC),

97.
Martti Koskenniemi, Evil Intentions or Vicious Acts? What is Prima Facie
Evidence of Genocide?, in LIBER AMICORUM BENGT BRoMS 180. 196 (Matti Tupamaki
ed., 1999).
98.
See FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES. NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE
CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 235 (1989) ("1Trhe 'will' or the intention of the party is simply a
'construct' of the interpreter which might or might not have much to do with the actual
motives and intentions....').
99.
See generally JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1996).
100.
NEIL MAcCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 271 (rev. ed.
1994).
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which appointed four consecutive special rapporteurs (all based in the
United Kingdom) to prepare reports for discussion and draft
articles. 10 1 The rapporteurs to a great extent all worked on the
premise of the contractual situation-that the value of an
undertaking for which consideration has been given must be
protected.
In such a contractarian discourse, there is little need to resort to
a middle ground between subjective intent and subjective
expectations, either one will do.' 0 2 The non-contractarian situation is
precisely where the limits of both subjective approaches become most
easily visible.
For the first of these rapporteurs, Oxford's Chichele professor
J.L. Brierly, the interim obligation was a good faith duty rather than
an obligation in strict law.' 0 3 Reproducing verbatim Article 9 of the
1935 Harvard Draft, 10 4 Brierly tersely added that it was included
merely for purposes of discussion as it stated a moral rather than a
legal obligation.' 0 5 Indeed, in discussing the draft article within the
ILC, Brierly supported a proposal to delete it altogether.' 0 6 A
substantial discussion ensued, which occasionally touched on the test
to be employed. 10 7 Thus, one delegate observed that the "intent to
cause harm [had] to be proved"' 0 8 while another added in a similar
vein that "between the time of signature and the time of ratification,
none of the States should do anything at all calculated to make the
ratification of the treaty impossible."'1 9 In the end, Brierly's article
was deleted by the narrowest of margins, a five-to-four vote. 110
Having resigned from the ILC, Brierly was succeeded as special
rapporteur by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, whose enthusiasm for the
interim obligation stood in marked contrast to Brierly's lackluster
approach."' Lauterpacht proposed to include a provision holding
that signature of a treaty creates an obligation to "refrain, prior to
ratification, from any act intended substantially to impair the value

101.
See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 13.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 31-40.
103.
See infra notes 105-06, 111 and accompanying text.
104.
See supra note 24.
105.
J.L. Brierly, Second Report: Revised Articles of the Draft Convention,
[1951] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 70, 73, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.1.
106.
Summary Records of the 86th Meeting, [19511 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 27, 34,
U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/1951 [hereinafter 86th Meeting].
107.

Id.

108.
86th Meeting, supra note 106, at 34 (Mr. Georges Scelle).
109.
Summary Records of the 87th meeting, [1951] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 36, 42,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951 (Mr. Jes6s Maria Yepes).
110. Id. at 42.
111.
See infra notes 112-15.
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of the undertaking as signed."112 Lauterpacht viewed the interim
obligation as part of the obligations corollary to the rights that
signatory states have, for example, in the context of reservations or
accessions,1 13 and found that the interim obligation "refers only to
such acts as are intended, and not merely calculated, to impair the
value of the obligation as signed."'1 4 The purpose of the interim
obligation, Lauterpacht continued, "is to prohibit action in bad faith
deliberately aiming at depriving the other party of the benefits which
it legitimately hoped to achieve from the treaty and for which it gave
1 15
adequate consideration."
At first blush, Lauterpacht here tries to have his cake and eat it
too. He manages to combine both the subjective intent of the
offending state and the legitimate expectations of the aggrieved state
in one sentence. 1 16 The example by which he continued, however,
117
indicates that what he had in mind (however unwittingly perhaps)
ran more along lines of manifest bad faith, rather than subjective bad
faith. A state:
would be acting in bad faith and in violation of a legal duty if... after
having undertaken to cede to another a portion of its territory it were to
proceed to alienate, in the interval between signature and ratification,
all the public property of the State which would otherwise pass to the
1 18
other contracting party under the rules of State succession.

What matters, in Lauterpacht's example, is not whether the ceding
state subjectively acts in bad faith. Rather, what matters is that its
action can be only plausibly regarded as a manifestation of bad faith.
A few things are noteworthy about Lauterpacht's observation.
First, both the example he provided and his chosen words, repeatedly
speaking of the "value" of an undertaking, the "benefits" of a treaty,
and "consideration," seem to suggest that foremost on his mind was
the contractual situation. 119 If that is correct, it follows that there is

112.
Hersch Lauterpacht, FirstReport on the Law of Treaties, [1953] 2 Y.B. Intl
L. Comm'n 90, 108, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/1953Add.1 (quoting the draft of pt. II,
art. 5(2)(b)) [hereinafter Lauterpacht, FirstReport].
113.
Id. at 110. The same view would later be echoed in E.W. Vierdag, The
International Court of Justice and the Law of Treaties, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 145 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds.,
1996).
114.
Lauterpacht, FirstReport, supra note 112, at 110.
115.
Id.
116.
Some have interpreted Lauterpacht as favoring a subjective intent test.
E.g., KAYE HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 57 (1967).
117.
In the sentence immediately subsequent to the block quote, infra, in the
text accompanying note 118 he loosely referred to "deliberate action intended to
deprive the other party of some of the benefits of the treaty," and used the same
formula to summarize his proposal. Lauterpacht, First Report, supra note 112. at 110.
118.
Id.
119.
See id.
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little point in searching for further hints of manifest intent ideas in
Lauterpacht's thought, for the simple reason that in contractual
20
situations, any bad-faith act will deprive the treaty of its objective.'
One must note, though, that on balance Lauterpacht supported an
intent-based test rather than a reliance test.
Lauterpacht's first report remained undiscussed, due to the
ILC's hectic schedule, and upon his election to the International
Court of Justice, Lauterpacht was succeeded as special rapporteur by
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. 121 Fitzmaurice's approach differed markedly
from that of his predecessors in various respects-for instance his
well-known reluctance to go beyond an expository code of the law of
treaties, and his conceptual approach to the topic to begin with. Like
Lauterpacht, however, he stressed the legal nature of the interim
122
obligation as well as an intent-based test.
Accordingly, Fitzmaurice's first report contained a draft Article
30, which held that signature of a treaty "[m]ay involve an obligation
for the government of the signatory State, pending a final decision
about ratification, or during a reasonable period, not to take any
1 23
action calculated to impair or prejudice the objects of the treaty.'
Indeed, the commentary simply referred to Lauterpacht's views on
the matter, to which Fitzmaurice merely added that he desired "to
state the proposition in question in somewhat cautious and qualified
24
terms."1
As the ILC was busy working on the law of the sea, Fitzmaurice's
first report was discussed in a general way only at the 368th, 369th,
and 370th meetings of the Commission; 125 his second and third
reports were left undiscussed, as the ILC had shifted its focus to
codifying diplomatic relations and arbitral procedure.' 2 6
These
reports, however, contained nothing of immediate relevance for
present purposes and neither did Fitzmaurice's fourth report (which

120.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-40.
121.
Lauterpacht's brief second report contains nothing of relevance for present
purposes. See Hersch Lauterpacht, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, [1954] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 123, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A]1954/Add.1.
122.
See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
123.
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Law of Treaties, [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 104,
113, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1.
124.
Id. at 122.
125.
Summary Records of the 368th Meeting, [1956] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 211,
216, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956; Summary Records of the 369th Meeting, [1956] 1
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 219, 219-26, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A]1956; Summary Records of
the 370th Meeting, [1956] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 226, 226-28, U.N. Dc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956.
126.
See generally [1957] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1957;
[1958] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/1958.
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was intensively discussed during the ILC's 1959 session) nor did his
127
fifth and final report.
With Fitzmaurice's election to the International Court of Justice,
the ILC appointed Sir Humphrey Waldock as its fourth special
rapporteur, and he explicitly followed the line set out earlier by
Lauterpacht and Fitzmaurice. 128
Waldock's draft Article 9, as
proposed in his first report, held that the signatory state "shall be
under an obligation in good faith to refrain from any action calculated
to frustrate the objects of the treaty or to impair its eventual
1 29
performance.
A lively debate ensued in the ILC, but not on the test to be
employed. All speakers addressing the issue and even formulating
amendments retained the same basic formula: what mattered was
that a state refrain from acts calculated to frustrate the objects of the
treaty. 30 One delegate, Mr. Tabibi, even seemed to formulate what
may come close to a manifest intent test when stating that "signature
should be regarded as having been done in good faith until the terms
of the treaty were violated, which was the only way of determining
whether the state had acted in good faith or not."1 31 While it is
possible to disagree with the statement that a violation of the treaty
pending ratification or entry into force is the only way of determining
good faith, Mr. Tabibi realized the difficulties inherent in any
subjective test.
Having heard the comments of interested governments, Waldock
returned to the matter of the interim obligation in his fourth
report. 132 Most of the governmental comments revolved around his
proposal to extend the interim obligation even to the negotiating
stage. Many thought this reflected a departure from customary law

127.
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties, [19601 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/130.
128.

Sir Humphrey Waldock, First Report on the Law of Treaties, (19621 2 Y.B.

Int'l L. Comm'n 27, 46, U.N. Doc. AICN.4JSER.A/I962Add.1.
129.
Id. at 46 (quoting the draft of art.9(2)(c)). Draft Article 5(3), moreover,
specified that during negotiations states shall refrain "from any action that might
frustrate or prejudice the purposes of the proposed treaty... ," Id. at 39. Article 9(3)
specifies much the same with respect to states that had already expressed consent to
be bound, but prior to entry into force of the treaty. Id. at 46.
130.
E.g., Summary Records of the 644th Meeting, [1962] 1 Y. B. Int'l L Comm'n
88, 89, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1962 (Mr. Castrin's reformulation); Summar Records
of the 644th Meeting, [1962] 1 Y. B. Int'l L. Comm'n 88, 91, U.N. Doc.
AICN.4/SER.A/1962 (Mr. Elias' reformulation); Summary Records of the 644th Meeting,
[1962] 1 Y. B. Int'l L. Comm'n 88, 94, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4JSER.A 1962 (rendition of Mr.
Briggs); Summary Records of the 644th Meeting, [1962] 1 Y. B. Int'l L. Comm'n 88. 95,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1962 (rendition of Mr. EI-Erian).
131.
Summary Records of the 644th Meeting, [1962] 1 Y. B. Int'l L. Comm'n 88,
90, U.N. Doc. AICN.4ISER.A/1962 (Mr. Tabibi).
132.
Sir Humphrey Waldock, FourthReport on the Law of Treaties, [19651 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 3,43-45, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/1965IAdd.l.
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and quite a few thought it went too far. The Japanese government
made the only comment on testing the interim obligation, mentioning
that "the criterion for refraining from acts calculated to frustrate the
objects of the treaty is too subjective and difficult of application. It
would prefer to leave the matter entirely to the good faith of the
parties and to omit the whole article."'1 33 Waldock, however, retained
in his revised draft article the subjective intent test: states were "to
refrain from acts calculated to frustrate"'134 a treaty's objects.
The lengthy discussions within the ILC during its 788th and
789th meetings do not shed much light on the matter of the criterion
to be used, with one exception. Mr. Reuter, believing that the special
rapporteur's focus on acts calculated to frustrate a treaty's objects
constituted an objective test, proposed that it be replaced by the
folowing subjective test: "when a State definitively expressed its will
to be bound, it created a certain expectation in its partners, and ... it
was the non-fulfillment of that expectation that was incompatible
with good faith."'135 Later, Mr. Reuter acknowledged that he may
have been thinking of a different situation than his colleagues in the
ILC. He had been thinking about frustrating the partners, whereas
136
his colleagues had mainly been thinking about frustrating a treaty.
Mr. Reuter's suggestions were not included.
A pair of other relevant remarks both seemed to favor a more or
less objective test. Mr. Jim6nez de Ar6chaga observed that good faith
would require a state during negotiations to "abstain from acts that
would nullify the essential purpose of the treaty,"'137 while Mr. Lachs,
invoking the example of an arms reduction agreement, felt that states
"were under an obligation to maintain the status quo, so as not to
invalidate the basic presumption of the agreement .
",138
These were, in the end, isolated positions. The collective intent
of the ILC seemed to point in the direction of a relatively objective
test-by focusing on the objects of the treaty-but tilting somewhat
140
Both Mr. Reuter 139 and Mr. Ago
toward subjective intent.
observed a small distinction between the English and French
versions-"frustrate" versus "r6duire a n6ant"-with the French
expressing the collective intent more accurately.
The operative

133.
Id. at 44.
134.
Id. at 45 (revised draft Article 17).
135.
Summary Records of the 788th Meeting, [1965] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 87,
91, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1965 [hereinafter 788th Meeting].
136.
Summary Records of the 789th meeting, [1965] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 94,
95, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1965 [hereinafter 789th Meeting].
137.
Id. at 97.
138.
Id.
139.
788th Meeting, supra note 135, at 91.
140.
Id. at 92.
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verb--"calculate" in English-remained unaffected until later, when
the ILC met again in 1966.141

More important is that at the 788th meeting, some ILC members
expressed an awareness of the pivotal distinction (in this context)
between contractual and normative instruments and its links to the
propriety of a given test. Unfortunately, these members expressed
their awareness in lapidary and somewhat unfortunate terms (due,
perhaps, to their being spoken in a meeting rather than written down
upon reflection).
Mr. Ago in particular pointed out that with multilateral treaties,
"it was difficult to accept the idea that.., a single State could commit
acts which frustrated its objects," and he observed that the examples
usually referred to tended to be of such a nature that a breach of the
obligation of good faith could be easily discerned. 142 While speaking
in terms of bilateral treaties, what Mr. Ago clearly had in mind was
143
not the bilateral form, but the underlying contractual exchange.
Mr. Tunkin also discussed the distinction between bilateral and
multilateral treaties, but like Mr. Ago, he seemed to have in mind the
underlying structure of the agreement-contractual versus
normative-rather than its outward manifestation. For example, he
observed that states being members of international organizations
sometimes were taking part in the conclusion of a treaty within those
organizations while disapproving of the very object of such a
treaty. 144 Since contractual engagements prepared under auspices of
international organizations are relatively rare, it seems plausible
that Mr. Tunkin too referred to normative undertakings.
The distinction between contractual and normative agreements
fell flat as none of the members arrived at the full realization that the
form of treaties was not at issue but rather their underlying
structure. Special Rapporteur Waldock effectively terminated the
discussion when he remarked "that such matters as tariff reductions,
which had been mentioned as one of the examples, could just as well
form the subject of a multilateral as of a bilateral treaty. 1' s
In light of this extensive drafting history, the text as finally
proposed by the ILC contained few surprises, with one exception.

141.
See infra text accompanying note 146.
142.
788th Meeting,supra note 135, at 92.
143.
For an interpretation of the records as focusing on form and not substance,
see Charme, supranote 7, at 98-103.
144.
788th Meeting, supra note 135, at 93.
145.
789th Meeting, supra note 136, at 96. Incidentally, the tariff reduction
example was mentioned by neither Mr. Ago nor Mr. Tunkin. To complicate matters
though, it may be observed that tariff reduction may be contractual but normative as
well. Surely, a general provision not to introduce new tariffs between a handful of
states cannot, without more, be deemed contractual. Yet, a numerical reduction of
existing tariffs between the same states may well be contractual in nature.
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Draft Article 15, as it had now become, spoke no longer of acts
"calculated" to frustrate the object of a proposed treaty, but used the
States were
ostensibly less subjective "tending to" description.
obliged to refrain from acts tending to frustrate the object of a
proposed treaty pending ratification and entry into force and even
1 46
during negotiations.
Despite having earlier rejected the idea to extend the interim
obligation to bare negotiations, the ILC's final draft nonetheless
included an obligation not to do anything which might tend to
frustrate a treaty's object pending negotiation. 147 Not surprisingly, it
was this provision that attracted much of the attention at the first
session of the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, 148 with the
representatives of many states advocating a deletion of the proposal
because it would unduly limit the freedom of states during
1 49
negotiations.
Although many representatives underlined the connection
between the idea of good faith and the interim obligation, few
pronounced themselves explicitly on the test to be used in
determining whether certain acts tend to frustrate or, as it was
changed by the Drafting Committee, whether those acts "defeat" a
treaty's object and purpose. 150 The few who did broach the matter of
the test to be employed all seemed to think in the direction of
subjective intent. Thus, the Hungarian representative, with a keen
eye for stating the obvious, opined that good faith "was a
fundamental principle of positive international law, which was

146.
Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, Part II: Report of the
InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Eighteenth Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 172, 202, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1. The change had been made
so as to bring the French and English texts in line, at the ILC's 892nd meeting. The
French changed from "actes de nature A" to "actes tendant A," with the English
changing from "acts calculated" to, on Sir Humphrey's proposal, "acts tending to."
Summary Records of the 892nd Meeting, [1966] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 321, 326, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966.
147.
Occasionally, pleas to that effect have been voiced in the post-Vienna
Convention literature. E.g., Tariq Hassan, Good Faith in Treaty Formation,21 VA. J.
INT'LL. 443 (1981).
148.
The provision has also been addressed in the contemporary literature. See
generally Morvay, supra note 7 (advocating deletion of the interim obligation at the
negotiating stage).
149.
As the representative of India put it, such an obligation during negotiations
"might result in hindering rather than promoting successful negotiations." Summary
Records of Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, U.N. Conference on the Law of
Treaties, 1st Sess., 19th mtg. at 97, 98, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.39/11 (1968).
The change was "a purely drafting change, made in the interests of clarity,"
150.
according to the chairman of the Drafting Committee. Summary Records of Meetings of
the Committee of the Whole, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., 61st mtg.
at 353, 361, U.N. Doc.AICONF.39/11 (1968).
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violated by a State acting in bad faith."15'
He added, in reference to
the proposed interim obligation during negotiations, that a state has
"no right fraudulently to undermine the success of negotiations."1 52
By the same token, the representative of Iraq observed that the
15 3
interim obligation was somehow related to "the problem of abuses,"
and Sir Humphrey Waldock, present at the Conference as expert
consultant, clarified (referring to negotiations) that what the ILC
probably had had in mind was that a state "remained free to break off
negotiations; only acts of bad faith were excluded. 154

VI. SCHOLARSHIP ON THE TEST

If one main idea resulted from the discussions and debates in the
ILC, spanning many years, many reports and rapporteurs, and
involving many ILC members, as well as from the discussions at the
Vienna Conference, it is the almost unanimous endorsement of a test
based on intent. With the exception of some comments made by Mr.
Reuter, 55 which were later more or less withdrawn in the realization
that he may not have been talking about the same thing as his
colleagues, fairly little support exists for a legitimate expectations
test.15 6 Instead, on balance it seems that the ILC in general wavered
between an objective test and a subjective intent test.15 7 Much of the
preparatory work seems to favor subjective intent, speaking
consistently of acts calculated to defeat a treaty's object. Towards the

151.
Summary Records of Meetings of the Committee of the Whole. U.N.
Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., 19th mtg. at 97, 102, U.N.
Doc.A/CONF.39111 (1968).
152.
Id.
153.
Summary Records of Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, U.N.
Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., 20th mtg. at 102, 103. U.N.
Doc.AGCONF.39111 (1968).
154.
Id. at 104.
155.
See supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
156.
It may be countered that blank references to good faith may be read as
involving legitimate expectations, but then it can also be said that good faith might
refer to the subjective intent of the offending state.
157.
Before the actual conclusion of the Vienna Convention, Morvay's reading of
the ILO's final draft summarized the ILC's ambivalence:
According to the draft as interpreted by the Commission, the obligation is
violated only by acts which are intended to frustrate the object of a treaty and
not also by acts which frustrate it unintentionally. Although the wording of the
draft is not quite conclusive on this point, this clearly appears from the genesis
of the provision.
Morvay, supra note 7, at 458. Nonetheless, he later seems to move toward a legitimate
expectations test when discussing the interim obligation at the negotiations stage:
"[l]n such circumstances there would not be any legitimate expectations .... " Id. at
459.
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end though, and without explanation, the focus seemed to shift to an
objective test, first speaking in the final draft of acts "tending to"
frustrate a treaty's object and resulting, eventually, in the wording of
Article 18, speaking of acts "which would defeat" a treaty's object and
158
purpose.
Given this background (but not in light of other considerations),
it is surprising' 5 9 that many post-Vienna Convention writers
advocate a legitimate expectations test. 160
Perhaps the most
sophisticated analysis along these lines is Paul McDade's work. 161 In
an article devoted to analyzing the legality of unilateral attempts to
explore the deep sea-bed by signatories of the 1982 UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea, he observes:
The emphasis should be on conduct a state can expect as a result of the
obligation of good faith rather than defining which actions constitute
bad faith. Examining the legitimate expectations which each state is
entitled to expect regarding the treaty which has been signed and the
conduct of other states in relation thereto is likely to be more fruitful
than focussing [sic] on bad faith or attempting to prove subjective
162
intent to abuse a set of rights.

McDade derives his legitimate expectations test from what is, in his
view, the rationale of the interim obligation-that is, "to ensure that
a state does not negotiate and conclude a treaty with another or

158.
Zoller, indeed, is insistent on the objective nature of the test: "Aucun
616ment intentionnel, aucune qualit6 psychologique n'interviennent en 'espbce."
ELIZABETH ZOLLER, LA BONNE FoI EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 74 (1977).

159.
So much so that elsewhere, perhaps unduly influenced by those writings, I
may have also somewhat over-emphasized the role of legitimate expectations in the
preparatory works. See Jan Klabbers, Re-inventing the Law of Treaties: The
Contributionof the EC Courts, 30 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 45 (1999).
160.
Not all writers, however, do so. Some manage to describe the interim
obligation in completely neutral terms. See supra note 6. See also SIR IAN SINCLAIR,
THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 42-44 (2d ed. 1984).

Charme

maintains perhaps somewhat indecisively that in focusing on acts calculated to defeat
a treaty's object and explicitly rejecting a legitimate expectations test, the ILC opted
for "the more objective language providing for resort to the object of a treaty." Charme,
supra note 7, at 96.
161.
Perhaps aware of the surprise he might otherwise create, McDade
tentatively suggests that:
[I]t is probably more in keeping with the intention of the parties to the Vienna
Conference to interpret the words in order to give effect to them, i.e., in the
'objective' sense. This would avoid the analysis of intention to commit bad faith
and could lead to an assessment of the legitimate expectations of states.
McDade, supra note 7, at 23. This latter step remains unexplained though, unless
McDade wishes to suggest that an objective test is bound to lapse into a subjective test
at any rate, in which case a legitimate expectations test is, in his view, to be preferred.
162.
Id. at 21.
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others, gain rights under the treaty[,] and then act in such a way as
163
to reduce the benefits agreed upon"
While McDade is perhaps the most explicit advocate of a
legitimate expectations test, he is by no means the only one. Mark
Villiger, in the first edition of his Customary InternationalLaw and
Treaties, devotes a brief case study to the drafting of Article 18 and
reaches the surprising conclusion that "[c]learly, Art. 18 gives
concrete meaning to the principle of good faith by protecting
'164
legitimate expectations.
Robert Turner, studying arms control agreements, eventually
advocates something of a legitimate expectations test when noting
that "the underlying principle behind article 18 is not that signed
treaties are binding; it is instead that fundamental fairness requires
a State to refrain from undermining an agreement on which another
State is relying ....,165 In addition, Yoram Dinstein, addressing the
situation involving the Chemical Weapons Convention, determines
that the interim obligation operates through legitimate expectations,
arguing that signature creates legitimate expectations to the extent
that the signatory state is bound to refrain from acts defeating the
object and purpose of a treaty, and in the case of the Chemical
Weapons Convention this means that a signatory state (or ratifying
state) is not allowed to accelerate the production and stockpiling of
chemical weapons, although it would not yet be under an obligation to
166
stop producing and stockpiling altogether.
16 7
is Jonathan Charney, who considered
A rare exception
whether the entry into force of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (LOS Convention) by means of a modifying collateral agreement
between many signatories and ratifiers of the LOS Convention
amounted to a violation of the interim obligation.' 68 He answered in
the negative, writing that by concluding their modifying agreement,

163.
Id. at 20. Note though how he moves away here from a legitimate
expectations test, and almost, but not quite, finds himself in the opposite camp by
looking at things from the position of the offending state.
164.
MARK EUGEN VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNIATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES
321 (1985). The case studies have disappeared in the second edition, which was
published in 1997.
Robert F. Turner, Note, Legal Implications of Deferring Ratification of
165.
SALT, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 777 (1981).
166.
Yoram Dinstein, Ratificationand Universalily, in THE CONvENTION O0.THE
A BREAKrHROUGH IN
PROHIBITION AND ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPON:
MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT 151, 154-55 (1995).
167.
For a study on good faith where the interim obligation is mentioned in
passing in terms of subjective intent-borrowed, so it seems, from the Lauterpacht
version-see J.F. O'CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (1991) ("lAin
obligation in good faith rests upon the signatory State to refrain from acts calculated to
frustrate the object of a treaty which is signed subject to ratification, acceptance[,] or
approval.").
Charney, supranote 4, at 398-99.
168.
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"signatories to the LOS Convention are unquestionably promoting,
-.169
not undermining, the object and purposes of the Convention .
Charney's conclusion was based on neither a legitimate
expectations test nor, strictly speaking, a subjective intent test.
Instead, it would seem that Charney, without being explicit, simply
asked himself whether the modifying agreement was good or bad for
the law of the sea at large. Surely, upon such a construction, any
modifying agreement that has the effect of triggering the entry into
force, and thereby the application of a comprehensive legal regime
among a multitude of participants, 17 0 must be a good thing.
Charney's test looks like an objective test, but it really is not, at
least not in the sense which seems to be pre-ordained by Article 18that is, defeat of a treaty's object and purpose. Instead, what
Charney does is objective in a different sense (and which is perhaps
not strictly objective to begin with); he employs a test of manifest
intent, or manifest bad faith.
The drafters of the modifying
agreement were clearly inspired by a sincere desire to help the LOS
Convention finally get off the ground. Their motives were reasonably
pure (although never free from self-interest), 171 and few if any
legitimate expectations were frustrated (as witnessed by the largescale support for the modifying agreement in the UN General
Assembly, where it was endorsed by 121 states, with seven states
abstaining and none voting against). 172 In those circumstances, if no
one thinks the interim obligation is being violated, no one seriously
can maintain that the modifying agreement did indeed breach the
interim obligation. Instead, the opposite conclusion is warranted, and
that is precisely the conclusion Charney reaches.
Clearly, academic opinion tilts in favor of a legitimate
expectations test. Equally clearly, the preparatory works of Article
18 of the Vienna Convention do not support a legitimate expectations
test. If anything, they cautiously support a subjective intent thesis.
Why, then, does academic opinion seem to favor so overwhelmingly a
legitimate expectations test?
The answer in part is that the Vienna Convention's drafters
thought primarily of contractual exchanges where the precise test to
By contrast, with normative
be used is of little relevance.

169.
Id. at 399.
170.
Charney formulates the object and purpose of the Convention on the Law of
the Sea as "to provide a comprehensive legal regime for the oceans accepted by
widespread participation." Id. at 399. One may quarrel with such a rendition, since
virtually every ambitious multilateral treaty aspires to provide a comprehensive legal
regime on the topic accepted by widespread participation. For present purposes,
however, such a quarrel is beside the point.
171.
Thus, Charney emphasizes U.S. national security interests in adhering to
the Convention. Id. at 385.
172.
Id. at 382.
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conventions, the precise test to be used is of pivotal importance. Most
authors have somehow addressed such a normative convention, be it
the Chemical Weapons Convention (Dinstein), 173 arms control
agreements (Turner),174 or the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(McDade, 175 Charney 176).
With such normative conventions, the subjective intent test
proves too much and too little at the same time. To stockpile or
produce chemical weapons despite having signed a convention not to
do so is only attributable to subjective intent; such behavior cannot be
accidental. Yet it does not automatically signify an intent to defeat a
treaty's object and purpose, for it may also be explained on other
grounds--such as, a lack of trust in the treaty partners or an
awareness of a potential free rider problem. The same applies to all
behavior which contravenes normative acts. It will always be the
result of the subject's intentions, yet rarely (if at all) will it
conclusively demonstrate the subjective intent to defeat a treaty's
object and purpose. Hence, to argue subjective intent in such
circumstances is to argue the obvious and the impossible an at once.
The explanatory force of the test is nil, which radically impairs its
utility as a test for the legality of behavior.
As a result, one is almost automatically forced to take on the
other position, that of legitimate expectations. At least this position
offers a glimmer of hope of being able to distinguish between serious
cases, possibly resulting in a finding of liability, and less serious cases
which one can simply ignore.
The main problem is, however, that precisely in such
circumstances it is not plausible for states to expect others to behave
in accordance with a set of norms prior to the entry into force of that
set of norms. In much the same way, a responsible government will
not expect its citizenry to pay higher taxes prior to a tax increase
entering into force. While one might occasionally hope, desire, wish,
or pray that a signatory will not engage in behavior which collides
with its future obligations, surely few would actually expect as much.
In other words, the reality of legitimate expectations may well be
doubted.
Moreover, it is precisely with normative conventions that a
variety of acts within the state may enter the picture. When States
A, B, and C conclude an anti-torture convention, A and B will hardly
expect C to fully meet future obligations prior to entry into force.
Arguably such expectations, however, may start to grow amongst
citizens of C. After all, why else would their government enter into

173.
174.
175.
176.

See supratext
See supra text
See supratext
See supratext

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

note 166.
note 165.
notes 161-63.
notes 168-72.
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an anti-torture commitment unless it would fully intend to abide by
its terms? In such a case, the citizens' expectations may be
frustrated, yet it is doubtful that the expectations of the citizens
(instead of the treaty partners) find protection under the interim
177
obligation.
In short, there seems to be no way out. The legitimate
expectations test, with normative treaties, is either hopelessly
unrealistic (when it comes to treaty partners) or hopelessly
inadequate (when it comes to citizens or companies). The subjective
intent test, on the other hand, is far too inclusive to be of any use and
cannot be conclusively demonstrated. Furthermore, from a broader
perspective, the paradox remains that whichever of those two tests
one uses, behavior which is reprehensible in itself does not defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty intended
to stop such behavior; rather
178
it underscores the need for the treaty.
Indeed, the authors mentioned above as seemingly utilizing a
legitimate expectations test, upon closer scrutiny do not really utilize
such a test. None of them engages in an analysis of whose
expectations are frustrated, in what ways exactly, and through which
behavior. No evidence of expectations exists to begin with. Instead,
there is an equation of undesirable behavior and behavior violating
the interim obligation. Charney's analysis is perhaps the most
instructive example thereof, precisely because he does not find the
interim obligation violated in the situation he analyzes. 179 He notes
that behavior generally deemed desirable is unlikely to violate the
interim obligation.' 8 0 Still, Charney's analysis is by no means the
only example.
It could hardly have been otherwise. Where saying that behavior
actually defeats a treaty's object and purpose does not make sense,
and where a subjective intent test is necessarily too much and too
little, all that is left is an appeal to legitimate expectations.
Intuitively, the above-mentioned authors have realized as much,
which explains why they phrase their arguments in terms of
legitimate expectations. Effectively, however, with no investigation
into legitimate expectations, they focus on the moral quality of the
behavior they observe, that of the offending party. Courts use the
same manifest intent test in the few cases where the interim
obligation has recently been invoked.

177.
The preparatory works provide not a shred of support for this proposition.
178.
Unless in extremely outrageous hypothetical scenarios. Think of all-out
chemical warfare, resulting in the annihilation of humankind. Such would defeat the
object and purpose of the Chemical Weapons Convention, but by then the interim
obligation is of little practical value anymore.
179.
Charney, supra note 4, at 399.
180.
Id.
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VII. JUDICIAL PRACTICE
The interim obligation rarely has made an appearance before a
court or tribunal. There are the classic cases discussed above,
Iloilol s' and Megalidis 8 2 in particular, but after those were decided,
the courts had little occasion to pronounce on the interim obligation
and had not been confronted with Article 18 claims since the
183
conclusion of the Vienna Convention.
This changed in the 1990s however, and three relatively recent
decisions are instructive. 84 In order to illustrate the difficulties
involved in applying the interim obligation and the various questions
it raised, these cases will be discussed at some length. Those
questions themselves are a consequence of the circumstance that
treaties are no longer always to be considered as compacts addressing
only states; instead, many of the difficulties in applying the interim
obligation (in all three cases) stem from the circumstance that a
private or legal person invoked the interim obligation.
A. S.E.B. v. State Secretary for Justice
The first (and arguably the least complicated) case is a decision
by the Judicial Division of the Dutch Council of State (the highest
administrative court in the Netherlands), in the case of S.E.B. v.
State Secretaryfor Justice.8 5 In this case, the Court refused to honor
an appeal on the interim obligation when a Moroccan teenager whose
father lived in the Netherlands claimed a right to be reunited on
grounds of the Rights of the Child Convention.'8 6 At the material
time, the Convention had been signed by the Netherlands but not yet
ratified, and accordingly had not yet entered into force for the
8 7
Netherlands.
The Court dealt with the argument in a few brief sentences.
Taking its cue from the explanation of Article 18 provided by the
Dutch government when it submitted the Vienna Convention for
parliamentary approval, the Court argued that:

181.
Iloilo Claims, 3 Ann. Dig. 336 (British-American Trib. 1925).
182.
A.A. Megalidis v. Turkey, 4 Ann. Dig. 395 (Turkish-Greek Mixed Arb. Trib.
1928).
183.
As Charme stated in 1991: "Since 1969, neither a court nor a tribunal has
decided a case directly on point." Charme, supranote 7, at 83.
184.
The three cases discussed supra in notes 60.62 seem to exhaust the matter.
I am not aware of any other decisions in which the interim obligation was discussed.
185.
For a brief case report, see S.E.B. v. State Secretany for Justice. Council of
State, Judicial Division, 9 July 1992, Institutes Collection No. 3696, 25 NETH. Y.B.
INT'LL. 528 (1994) [hereinafter S.E.B. v. State Secretoy for Justice).
186.
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Nov. 20, 1989. 28

I.L.M. 1448 (1989).
187.

S.E.B. v. State Secretary for Justice, supra note 185, at 529.
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[T]his obligation means in the majority of cases that a State should
refrain from acts which would make the future application of the treaty
in question impossible once it has entered into force. Contrary to what
the appellant evidently believes, it cannot be maintained that the
refusal constitutes an act that makes the future application of the Child
188
Rights Convention impossible ....

The case neatly illustrates the difficulties embodied in the various
tests. While the Dutch administrative decision that gave rise to the
proceedings was based on the subjective intent of the Dutch
authorities (it could hardly have been otherwise), it was obviously not
rendered with the intent to undermine the Convention or to defeat its
object and purpose. Hence, it is difficult to argue that the Dutch
authorities acted in bad faith. To argue, on the other hand, that the
appellant's legitimate expectations were frustrated would have
required the following: first, that the appellant's expectations (as
opposed to those of treaty partners) are the expectations that the
interim obligation aspires to protect; and second, that such legitimate
expectations did indeed exist (or that a reasonable person could have
legitimately expected a family reunion based on a non-ratified
Convention) and were frustrated by the contested decision.
Establishing this principle was a tall order, particularly in light of the
abundantly clear fact that the Convention at issue had yet to enter
into force for the Netherlands.
The Court thus was almost forced to apply a more or less
objective test, and could only reach the obvious conclusion. There
was no way in which a single incident could possibly be construed as
defeating the object and purpose of the Rights of the Child
Convention.
One is hard put to find fault with the decision as a matter of law,
and in light of the facts of the case-the child being almost mature, and
having close family in Morocco as well-it is even difficult to disagree
with the outcome, yet it does not set a terribly satisfying precedent.
Suppose that the child were much younger, and that the only relatives in
Morocco were distant uncles. In those circumstances, surely, the
outcome adopted by the Court would have been much harder to accept.
In those circumstances, the objective test applied by the Court, however
correct in principle, would have led to disastrous results-the sacrifice of
a young child to no more than a formality. Instead, in those
circumstances one would hope that the tribunal would have found in the
child's favor, despite the absence of intent or expectations and despite
the circumstance that the Dutch authorities came nowhere near a defeat
of the Convention's object and purpose. In short, had circumstances
been different, one hopes that the tribunal would have done the "right

188.

Id. at 530.
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thing," and the only possible rationalization of doing the right thing here
is a manifest intent test.
B. Opel Austria
The manifest intent test was eventually chosen by the EC's
Court of First Instance in what is already becoming something of a
landmark case, the Opel Austria case, decided in 1997.189 The
complexity of the case (and the reason for the lengthy analysis here)
is in large measure not the result of a difficult set of facts, but rather
a result of the uncertainties involving the interim obligation and the
somewhat wavering approaches thereto on the part of the applicant,
the intervening state, and the Court itself.
At issue was whether the EC Council had violated the interim
obligation in imposing tariffs against gearboxes made by Opel
Austria, ostensibly as a retaliatory measure to countenance
government subsidies, shortly before the Agreement establishing the
European Economic Area (EEA) entered into force between Austria
and the EC (as well as some other states, effectively extending the
reach of parts of EU law).1 90 A complicating factor here was that the
relevant prohibition contained in the EEA agreement would
undoubtedly be self-executing in the legal orders of the territories
covered by Community law from the moment of entry into force
onwards. 191 Yet another complicating factor was that the Council
192
deliberately backdated its publication of the contested regulation.
The Court eventually annulled the contested regulation,
reasoning that the regulation had 'infringed the applicant's
legitimate expectations.' 193 Curiously, though, it is not quite obvious
that the Court employed a legitimate expectations test. Even more
accurately perhaps, to the extent that it did employ such a test, it did
not do so very felicitously and consistently. What the Court ended up
referring to as the applicant's legitimate expectations was, upon
closer scrutiny, simply the result of a manifest intent test.
A complicated and large agreement such as the EEA-one that
creates not only an elaborate free trade regime but also institutions

189.
Opel Austria, supra note 1. For comments, see Jan Kiabbers, Protection of
Legitimate Expectations in EC Law Derivingfrom an InternationalAgreement Prior to
its Entry into Force: The Opel Austria Decision of the Court of First Instance, 95
LAKIMIES 732 (1997). See also P.J. Kuijper, The Court and the Tribunal of the EC and
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 25 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR.
INTEGRATION 1 (1998).
190.
Opel Austria, supranote 1, paras. 39-44.
191.
Id. para. 102. The text of the EEA Agreement can be found in 1994 O.J. (L
1) 3.
192.
Opel Austria, supra note 1. para. 46.
193.
Id. para. 123.
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designed to supervise the workings of the regime194-is not very
likely to see its object and purpose defeated by a single act which
would run counter to its terms committed some time before its entry
into force. 195 Hence, any attempt to apply the objective test, as
formulated in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, 196 immediately
encounters the obstacle that as formulated, Article 18 is of little use
when it comes to such complex agreements that involves institutions
and that may contain norms of general application.
The arguments invoked by both parties as well as by the
government of Austria, intervening on behalf of the company,
illustrate the problematic nature of the test to be employed in
determining whether or not the interim obligation has been violated.
The applicant, Opel Austria, presented at least three different
renditions of the interim obligation and the test to be used. 197 First,
it interpreted the prohibition of Article 18 to mean a prohibition of
"circumvention by any State or international organization of
the
binding nature of international agreements by means of acts which
are incompatible with the basic principles of the agreement taken
immediately prior to its entry into force."'198 Read like this, the
objective test no longer demands that object and purpose are
defeated, but merely that acts are incompatible with the basic
principles of the agreement. If anything, that lowers the hurdle
considerably.
Second, its rendition was reworked when it observed that the
interim obligation constitutes "an expression of the general principle
of protection of legitimate expectations in public international law,
according to which a subject of international law may, under certain
conditions, be bound by the expectations created by its acts in other
subjects of international law."'1 9 Here the applicant seemed to opt
for a legitimate expectations test (regardless of whether acts are

194.
The Court itself emphasized this complicated nature. Id. para. 107 ("[T]he
EEA Agreement involves a high degree of integration, with objectives which exceed
those of a mere free-trade agreement.').
195.
Compare on this point the case note by Peter Fischer in 35 COMMON
MARKET L. REV. 765, 779-80 (1998).
196.
To be sure, the Community as such is not a party to the 1969 Vienna
Convention or to its 1986 counterpart on the law of treaties concluded with or between
international organizations (the latter has yet to enter into force). Nonetheless, the
ECJ has observed on various occasions that the EC is bound by customary
international law. A first hint to that effect is contained in the decision in Case C286/90, Public Prosecutor v. Poulsen & Diva Navigation, 1992 E.C.R. 1-6048. See also
generally DOMINIC McGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 36 (1997).

197.
198.
applicant's
199.

At least, in the versions as formulated by the Court.
Opel Austria, supra note 1, para. 76 (providing the Court's rendition of the
argument).
Id. para. 78.
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compatible with a treaty's "basic principles"), but in terms too broad
for the case. Clearly, the "other subjects of international law" that
the Court speaks of, whose expectations are to be protected, used to
be simply the treaty partners.
Given the debatable status of
companies as subjects of international law generally, 20 0 it is not at all
clear whether the applicant here refers to treaty partners or also to
legal persons registered in states that happen to be treaty partners,
or possibly makes an even broader erga omnes argument to the effect
that the international community at large (including its component
elements) has an interest in seeing to it that the Council does not
20 1
undermine a prospective treaty provision.
Third, in the next paragraph of the opinion, the test to be
employed changes yet again, with the applicant arguing that Article
18 "contains an unambiguous, unconditional prohibition of acts that
are incompatible with the aims and objects of international
agreements." 20 2 Here it is not defeat of object and purpose that
matters, nor conflict with a treaty's "basic principles" (let alone
legitimate expectations), but rather incompatibility with object and
purpose. Again, in comparison to Article 18's words, that amounts to
a lowering of the hurdle because many things may be incompatible
with a treaty's object and purpose without actually defeating it.
Thus, in making its case, Opel Austria presented three substantially
different versions of the interim obligation, thereby underlining how
complicated matters really are.
The government of Austria emphasized the importance of
legitimate expectations. It stated that the EUs Member States share
a general principle of law according to which "a party to a binding
agreement must act in good faith to safeguard the interests of other
parties to or beneficiaries of the agreement ....',203 Note that in
formulating the interim obligation in this way and by stressing the
interests of beneficiaries, the Austrian government presupposed that
the interim obligation also extends to private and legal persons
20 4
within a state.
The Council's response to the allegations that it had breached
the interim obligation was rather terse. It claimed that its behavior

200.

E.g.,

PETER

ALANCZUK,

AKEHURST'S

MODERN

INTRODUCTION

TO

INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (7th rev. ed. 1997) (stating that the topic is "extremely
controversial").
201.
On the place of erga omnes arguments in international legal discourse, see
Simma, supra note 21, at 293-300.
202.
Opel Austria, supra note 1, para. 79.
203.
Id. para. 83.
204.
There is also a hint to private and legal persons being covered by the
interim obligation; in passing the contested regulation, the Council had infringed the

rights of Austria and its citizens, so the Austrian government claimed. Id. para. 82.
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was fully compatible with the EEA Agreement and "therefore" 205 did
not defeat the EEA Agreement's object and purpose. 20 6 The precise
test underlying the Council's suggestion remains somewhat vague.
One could perhaps put it in terms of the Council hiding the absence of
any deeper thoughts by insisting on the quasi-objectivism of "no
violation, no defeat. '20 7 Still, what the Council referred to was the
absence of a violation of the EEA Agreement.
Whether this
necessarily entails the absence of a violation of the interim obligation
is a different matter. The opposite, at any rate, is implausible: a
violation of a treaty provision prior to entry into force by definition
will not defeat that treaty's object and purpose.
The Court's construction of the interim obligation was rather
complicated, which is not surprising in light of the diversity of
versions presented by the parties. It analyzed the interim obligation
as an obligation of good faith, and the Court held that in
20 8
of
international law this principle of good faith is the "corollary"
the principle of legitimate expectations. This would seem to suggest
that the Court's main test was a legitimate expectations test, and
indeed the Court seemed to reconstruct the interim obligation in
terms of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, which
itself has found recognition in EC law. 20 9 It found that because the
contested regulation would violate the EEA Agreement after its entry
into force, it "follows" that by adopting the measure pending entry
into force, the Council "infringed the applicant's legitimate
210
expectations."
Yet, to conclude that the Court applied a legitimate expectations
test would be hasty for several reasons. It may be the case that Opel
Austria had started to nurse certain expectations upon hearing of the
conclusion of the EEA Agreement, or that it could reasonably have
done So.211 There is, however, fairly little in the Court's opinion

205.
Id. para. 85.
206.
Logical as the Council's position may seem on this point, the International
Court of Justice has nonetheless on one occasion held that behavior violated a treaty's
object and purpose, independent of the question of whether it also violated the actual
terms of the treaty. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 135-42 (June 27).
207.
Opel Austria, supra note 1, para. 85.
208.
Opel Austria, supra note 1, para. 93.
209.
If I understand Mengozzi correctly, the protection of legitimate
expectations in Community law covers par excellence private and legal persons
operating within the Member States. See Paolo Mengozzi, Evolution de la ntnthode
suivie par la jurisprudence communautaire en mati~re de protection de la confiance
ligitime, 4 REVUE DU MARCHt UNIQUE EUROPEEN 13, 18 (1997).
210.
Opel Austria, supranote 1, para. 123.
211.

See TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

LAW 152 (3d ed. 1994) (presenting a "reasonable man" test in which "an expectation is
not legitimate unless it is reasonable: the question here is whether a prudent man
would have had the expectation").
See also P.P. Craig, Substantive Legitimate
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which bears out this assumption. At no point did the Court actually
investigate whether expectations had been created or had started to
2 12
form.
The Court also refrained from investigating whether the
expectations of private companies are among those that are protected
by Article 18. Presumably, an argument could be made in favor of
such a conception, but despite a few fleeting references in the
argument of the Austrian government to this effect,2 1 3 the Court
failed to pick it up.
In addition, the question remains from what date forward
legitimate expectations may start to grow and be nurtured. The
Court seemed to think that the moment of ratification-or approvalwas decisive, which was December 13, 1993.214 If so, with the EEA
Agreement destined to enter into force on January 1, 1994, the
applicant would have exactly eighteen days to form and nurture
legitimate expectations, which by any standard, is not a long period of
21 5
time.
Moreover, given the negotiating history of the EEA Agreement
(with a first agreed version being declared unacceptable by the EC
Court),2 16 one could argue that companies such as Opel Austria would
already start to entertain expectations from the moment of
17
negotiations onwards, culminating in the moment of signature.
There is nothing truly eccentric about such an argument, but it does
come with a serious drawback. As a signature does not yet signify
consent to be bound, states remain at liberty not to ratify and

Expectations in Domestic and Community Law, 55 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 289, 306.07 (1996)
(arguing that a claim based on legitimate expectations may succeed when based on a
promise or course of conduct but may fail when expectations are not reasonable).
212. Bettina Kahil, EuG: Rfickdatierung des Amtsblattes, 8 EUROPAISCHE
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 664, 671, 672 (1997) (Die Voraussetzungen
einer Berufung auf den Vertrauensschutzgrundsatz ... priafte das EuG nicht naher").
213. See supranotes 203-04 and accompanying text.
214.
Opel Austria, supra note 1, paras. 92, 94 (holding that legitimate
expectations apparently may be nursed in a situation "where the Communities have
deposited their instruments of approval").
215.
The period is even shorter if one holds that those expectations must have
come to fruition on the date the contested measure was taken, which was December 20,
1993, leaving the company a week to form its expectations. On the other hand, the
contested measure was only published in mid-January 1994, after the EEA Agreement
had already entered into force. If the actual moment of publication is decisive, then
Opel Austria's expectation had some three weeks to come to fruition.
216.
Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079.
217.
See Craig, supra note 36, at 92 (arguing that legitimate expectations often
are inherent in some form of representation being made). In the present context, that
means that the element of publicity is not without importance, which once again would
tend to emphasize the moment of signature rather than ratification. See id.
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therefore no legitimate expectations can possibly be built on
218
signature alone.
Yet, natural or legal persons are unlikely to be well-informed
about ratification or approval, as those acts usually take place in
silence, through diplomatic channels. Thus, on the theory (which
appears necessary) that publicity is a prerequisite for natural and
legal persons (other than treaty partners themselves of course) to
start to form legitimate expectations, usually only the moment of
signature meets the publicity requirement; yet to expect things on the
basis of signature alone is, in a very real sense, naive.
In the absence of any investigation into expectations and the
legitimacy thereof, and in the absence of an examination of the
preliminary question as to whether the expectations of Opel Austria
are to be protected at all (and if so, from what date forward), the
suspicion grows that the Court did not apply a legitimate
expectations test at all, but rather applied something else. Paying lip
service to a legitimate expectations test (presumably precisely
because such a test is well accepted in Community law itself), 2 19 it
actually applied a test of manifest bad faith.
This suspicion finds confirmation in particular in the innuendo
with which the Court reminds us that what the Council had done was
improper. The Court noted that from December 13, 1993 forward, the
Communities were aware of the date of entry into force of the EEA
Agreement, 220 and thus, the Council should not have adopted its
regulation.
Indeed, the Court went on to make exactly this point, although it
made it, somewhat curiously, under the heading of legal certainty.
EC law is subject to a principle of legal certainty, yet by adopting its
regulation "when it knew with certainty that the EEA Agreement
would enter into force" shortly, "the Council knowingly created a
situation in which, with effect from January 1994, two contradictory
rules of law would co-exist ....
,"221 Moreover, by deliberately
backdating publication of the contested regulation, the Council yet
again violated the principle of legal certainty. 2 22 On this point, the
Court scathingly concluded that "the conduct of the Council's
'223
administration must therefore be regarded as particularly serious.

218.
219.

See generally Cahier, supra note 7 (arguing this point less explicitly).
E.g., HARTLEY, supra note 211, at 152-55. See also Mengozzi, supra note

209.
220.
Opel Austria, supra note 1, para. 92. See also Kuijper, supra note 189, at
16 (suggesting that the Court may have been especially strict as the Council's breach of
good faith had been "particularly egregious").
221.
Opel Austria, supra note 1, para. 125.
222.
Id. paras. 131-32.
223.
Id. para. 133.
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While the backdating may be regarded as difficult to reconcile

with legal certainty, the Court's first point had little to do with legal
certainty. 22 4 The Council did not create two contradictory rules of
law, one relating to trade in general-the EEA Agreement,
prohibiting tariffs-and one relating only to certain products
produced by the applicant-the increased tariff on Opel Austria's
gearboxes. If that were the case, then every application of any legal
rule itself would constitute a legal rule, potentially conflicting with
the notion of legal certainty. 225 The point is not so much that the
Council violated the notion of legal certainty (although it
unquestionably did this when it backdated the publication of the
contested regulation), but rather that the imposition of the tariff was
unwarranted altogether.
Defending the imposition of a tariff a mere few weeks prior to the
scheduled prohibition of such tariffs is difficult. In this light, clearly
the Council's behavior was less than commendable. Yet to say that it
acted against the principle of legal certainty is far from convincing. It
is even less convincing to argue that the Council's behavior frustrated
the legitimate expectations of a single legal person operating on the
territory of a prospective treaty partner and thereby somehow
defeated the object and purpose of the entire EEA Agreement in all
its richness.
It is reasonably obvious to any observer that the Council's
behavior was less than desirable. To capture this sentiment in an
appropriate rule of law proved difficult, 220 however, and the Court
could eventually only do so by applying the interim obligation in
unsuspected ways and without conducting much of an investigation
into the expectations, legitimate or otherwise, of the company
concerned, or whether those expectations were protected to begin
with, and if so, from what date onwards. In conclusion, the Court did
not so much apply a legitimate expectations test, but simply
proceeded to do the right thing-annul the contested regulation. The
reasoning may have been feeble, but the result was unequivocally
equitable.

224.
That is not to say that there is no connection between legitimate
expectations and legal certainty, for there certainly is. See generally Craig. supra note
36.
225.
Kahil, supra note 212, at 672 (observing the same implausibihty but
suggesting that if there truly were two contradictory norms, then some principle of
hierarchy ought to have been applied so as to give preference to one of them).
226.
Indeed, it has also proved difficult to apply traditional law of treaties
notions in other circumstances involving the multilayered EC. For an overview, see
Klabbers, supranote 159.
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C. Danisco Sugar
Ironically, perhaps the clearest illustration of the pragmatic reinvention of the interim obligation into a test of manifest intent can
be found in a judgment that refrained from dealing with the issue,
227
the 1997 Danisco Sugar decision of the European Court of Justice.
A week and a half before January 1, 1995, when Sweden's
membership of the European Union would take effect, Sweden's
parliament adopted a new Sugar Law on December 20, 1994, which
would take effect a day before Sweden's accession to the Union. 22 8
Under the Sugar Law, anyone holding large amounts of sugar in
stock at midnight, December 31, 1994, was to be subjected to a heavy
tax. 229 The purpose was to prevent speculation with sugar, because
the regular EU sugar price (which would become applicable upon
accession) differed markedly from the then current Swedish market
price. 230 As a result of the new law, Danisco Sugar AB was liable to
pay, according to a determination of the Swedish agricultural board,
close to half a billion Swedish crowns by way of sugar tax. 23 1 Danisco

brought proceedings for annulment of the Sugar Law, claiming
among other things that the enactment of the Sugar Law just prior to
entry into force of Sweden's membership of the EU amounted to a
violation of the interim obligation. 2 32 The local court referred the
matter to the EC Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 177
23 3

EC.

Although the EC Court did not address the point about the
interim obligation, holding it to be "unnecessary,"234 the case is
nevertheless interesting for various reasons. One reason is the way
Danisco Sugar raised the argument. Surely it must have felt that its
legitimate expectations were jeopardized when it was confronted, out
of the blue, with a heavy tax liability. Then again, the question
remains whether it makes sense to argue, with the interim obligation,
that a private company's expectations are at all protected. Here the
situation was even more tricky, in that if legitimate expectations

227.
Case C-27196, Danisco Sugar AB v. Allmnna Ombudet, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6653
(Judgment of the Court), LEXIS, Legal (excluding U.S.) Library, ECJ File.
228.
Id. para. 2.
229.
Id. para. 9.
230.
Id. para. 10.

231.
Id. para. 13.
232.
Id. para. 14.
233.
Since the renumbering of the treaties at Amsterdam, this is now Article
234 EC. A consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community as amended can be found in 37 I.L.M. 56
(1998).
234.
Danisco Sugar, supra note 227, para. 31.
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were frustrated, the frustration of the Swedish company's2 35
expectations was the result of the activities of the Swedish
government. If the issue of whether the interim obligation covers the
expectations of private companies within the aggrieved party is
debatable, it seems even more debatable whether it covers the less
certain expectations of those within the offending party.
Put differently, between the contracting parties themselveshere, the EC and Sweden-no expectations were frustrated. In fact,
there is some ground to suspect that the two treaty partners acted in
collusion. 236 Hence, on this "intergovernmental" level, no problem
relating to the interim obligation occurred or could possibly occur; no
expectations of the treaty partners were frustrated, none was accused
of acting in bad faith, and neither of the parties considered that the
enactment of the contested Sugar Law defeated the object and
purpose of Sweden's accession to the Union.
Although the Court did not address the interim obligation,
Advocate-General La Pergola did devote some attention to it, after
having noted that the Court would not have jurisdiction, as it
concerned the behavior of the Swedish government prior to
accession.2 37 The Advocate-General seemed to be of two minds. At
one point he suggested that Danisco Sugar's observation that Sweden
violated the interim obligation may have been "not without
foundation," 238 yet later he acknowledged, without further
explication, his "agree[ment] with the approach taken by the Swedish
239
Government and the Commission."
Advocate-General La Pergola's apparent contradiction neatly
captured the tension between the two tests addressed throughout this
Article. The remark that Danisco Sugar's observation was not
without foundation may well have been inspired by sympathy for the
Still, had anyone actually done
company's unexpected plight.
something wrong? Quite the opposite, the Advocate-General held
that the Sugar Law had been enacted as a tax on profits made as a
result of the transition from a domestic market organization to a
communitarian market organization, and there was nothing wrong

The company's nationality is left undiscussed in the pubhshed documents,
235.
although both the name, Danisco, and the intervention of the Danish government on
the company's behalf suggest Danish nationality. At any rate, this seems of little
relevance here, as what mattered was that the company operated in Sweden and found
itself to have fallen victim to a Swedish act rather than an act of Sweden's treaty
partner.
236.
Case C-27/96, Danisco Sugar AB v. Allimanna Ombudet., 1997 E.C.R. I6653, para. 23 (Opinion of Advocate-General La Pergola), LEXIS. Legal (excluding
U.S.) Library, ECJ File.
Id. para. 23.
237.
Id. para. 19.
238.
239.
Id. para. 23.
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with doing that. 240 In support, the Advocate-General relied above all
on the text of the Sugar Law and its supposed effects, 24 1 but

works of the Sugar Law in
additionally also invoked the preparatory
242
order to determine manifest intent.
In much the same way as in the decision of the Dutch
administrative tribunal in S.E.B. v. State Secretary for Justice, the
argument as made and discussed focused on manifest intent-that is,
the intent of the Swedish government, as it manifested itself to the
outside world. That intention was proper, so the Advocate-General
suggested, and as a result, the mere circumstance that a company's
expectations-a company operating in Sweden, moreover-may have
been frustrated by Swedish behavior on the eve of Sweden's accession
was not something the Court should address.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The argument of this Article is that particularly with noncontractual, normative, multilateral arrangements, the interim
obligation as laid down in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention does
not provide much relief. The objective test it seemingly prescribes
makes no sense in a normative context (as one can hardly defeat the
object and purpose of generally desirable behavior), and inevitably
lapses into a test of either subjective intent or legitimate expectations
(or hypothetically, both), and those turn out to be of little use as soon
as they need to be applied. Consequently, both judicial practice and
post-Vienna Convention scholarship turn away from the letter of
Article 18 and apply, while often ostensibly referring to legitimate
expectations, really a simple but effective manifest intent test, which
is the following: if behavior seems unwarranted and condemnable, it
may be assumed to have been inspired by less than lofty motivations
and ought to be condemned, regardless of whether anyone's
legitimate expectations are really frustrated or can reasonably be
said to have been frustrated, regardless of actual proof of bad faith.
Only such a conception can explain why the EC Court of First
Instance could find the imposition of a tariff shortly before the entry
into force of an agreement prohibiting them to constitute a violation
of the interim obligation. Only such a conception can explain why
authors can condemn the purchase or production of arms on the eve
of a disarmament agreement or why states can be accused of violating
international law by laying mines after having signed a convention

240.
Id. The judgment itself is built on similar foundations. Id.
241.
Id. para. 40 (holding that the Sugar law could not have had any impact at
all on the sugar market).
242.
Id. para. 29.
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not to do so. Conversely, only such a conception can explain why a
Dutch tribunal could reject a plea for a family reunion despite the
Dutch having already signed a convention which would probably
support the plea or why the EC Court could ignore a plea that an
effort to manage the modalities of accession to the EC would violate
international law. In addition, only such a conception can explain
why authors can persuasively conclude that to drastically change the
terms of a large convention on the law of the sea before its entry into
force is nonetheless not in violation of the interim obligation.
As traditionally conceived, the interim obligation as laid down in
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was, in
effect, meant to serve in limited circumstances only and can only
provide a meaningful service in the limited confines of contractual
situations. Where, by contrast, international agreements are
concluded to further the community interest, Article 18 as drafted
and conceived can only disappoint.
Instead of simply discarding the idea of the interim obligation as
unworkable, or positing that some treaties are qualitatively different
so as to warrant that they effectively enter into force upon signature
even if the text itself prescribes ratification, the more sensible
approach is to help the interim obligation adapt to circumstances that
were never considered during the drafting stage. Such relatively
painless adaptation pays homage to the vitality and flexibility of
international law, and the law of treaties in particular. On the
relatively few occasions where Article 18 arguments have been made
in recent decades (be it by courts or by authors), they have invariably
involved a test different from anything contemplated by the ILC or
self-evident under the terms of Article 18 itself. Such applications of
the interim obligation are best explained with the help of a "manifest
intent test," which is useful shorthand for saying that where behavior
pending entry into force of an agreement is generally held to be
morally obnoxious in light of what the agreement itself represents,
then it violates the interim obligation. Such an approach has the
dual benefit of allowing the law to remain flexible while remaining
faithful to some of our dearest moral convictions, which is exactly
what these situations require.

